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COMMENTS
"TO LOVE AND HONOR ALL THE DAYS OF
YOUR LIFE": A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE?
Do you promise to be true... in good times and in bad, in sick-
ness and in health, to love... and honor... all the days of your
life?
... [T]o have and to hold, from this day forward, for better, for
worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, until death
do you part?'
My Love is of a birth as rare
As 'tis, for object, strange and high;
It was begotten by Despair
Upon Impossibility
And yet I quickly might arrive
Where my extended soul is fixed;
But Fate does iron wedges drive,
And always crowds itself betwixt.2
Men and women coming together in love and companionship is a tradi-
tion as old as time.3 The marital unit provides a release and a conduit for
1. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENGLISH IN THE LITURGY: THE RITES OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 725-28 (1990) [hereinafter RITES]. This Comment will address the
legal arguments for and against a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. However,
whenever possible this Comment shall refrain from discussing or critiquing the moral, ethi-
cal, religious, social, or psychological implications of same-sex marriage. When such a dis-
cussion occurs it is merely to further elucidate a pertinent issue regarding the legal
concepts discussed.
2. Andrew Marvell, The Definition of Love, in 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENG-
LISH LITERATURE 1388 (M.H. Abrams ed., 5th ed. 1986) (footnote omitted).
3. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) ("The institution of mar-
riage as a union of man and woman ... is as old as the book of Genesis."), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); see also G. ROBINA QUALE, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE
SYSTEMS 1-2 (1988) (indicating that early hunter-gatherers practiced a form of consort-
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a myriad of human needs and desires: the problems of loneliness and iso-
lation, the need for sexual release, intimacy, partnership, and child rear-
ing.4 In addition to emotional and psychological benefits, marriage
provides substantial legal and economic advantages.5 Due to these bene-
fits, marriage is seen by the courts and citizens in general as "the most
important relation in life. ' ' 6 So important is the institution of marriage
that it is deemed a fundamental right deserving constitutional protection.
7
The status of marriage as the pillar of our social structure has led state
legislatures and state and federal courts to provide numerous protections
for the marital unit.' The courts, however, define the right to marry nar-
ship). Additionally, "[m]arriage, as the socially recognized linking of a specific man to a
specific woman and her offspring, can be found in all societies." Id. at 2.
4. See John D. Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to
Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George-or Mary and Alice at the Same Time, 10 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 33, 33-35(1984); David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 957, 994 (1979).
5. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (1988) (providing for tax adjustment for gift taxes paid
by decedent spouse); id. § 2056 (qualifying spouses for estate tax deductions); id. § 6013
(permitting husband and wife to file joint tax returns); 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988) (grant-
ing Social Security benefits to married couples); id. § 426 (providing Medicare benefits to
spouses of insured individuals); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1988) (stating that
spouses are entitled to wrongful death claims); MASS. GEN. L. CH. 190, § 1 (1990) (permit-
ting intestate succession for a surviving spouse); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701 (1991) (provid-
ing for alimony upon entry of divorce decree); Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 582-83 (Cal.
1988) (stating that loss of consortium does not extend to cohabitating individuals); Coli-
seum Motor Co. v. Hestor, 3 P.2d 105, 106 (Cal. 1931) (holding spouse entitled to tort
recovery for wrongful death); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (listing various
Hawaii statutory provisions granting legal and economic benefits to married individuals).
See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 127-95 (1976)
(discussing various legal benefits conferred to married couples); Barbara J. Cox, Alterna-
tive Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Litigation, Legislation and
Collective Bargaining, 2 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 46-50 (1986) (discussing the availability of
visitation rights through the marital unit); Ingram, supra note 4, at 35-37 (discussing vari-
ous state and federal benefits conferred on the basis of marital status).
6. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56. The revered
status of marriage is limited in these and other cases to traditional marriages and did not
contemplate a same-sex marriage. See id. at 55-57.
7. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
8. In Zablocki, the Supreme Court held that the right to marry is an integral part of
the fundamental right to privacy and any statute that burdens this right triggers the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny review of the statute. Id. at 383-84. In addition to the federal
constitutional protection extended to marriage, states provide the marital unit with numer-
ous protections as well. See, e.g., Huntington v. Saunders, 120 U.S. 78, 79-82 (1887) (stat-
ing one spouse is not liable for the obligations of the other); Jersey Shore Medical Ctr.-
Fitken Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1005 (N.J. 1980) (holding that under the
New Jersey Married Woman's Property Act, one spouse is not liable for the other's obliga-
tions); Madison, Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCES § 28.03(2) (1992) (creating single family
zoning and thereby providing a special living environment for married couples and their
children); see also 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
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rowly,9 While heterosexuals are afforded the economic and legal benefits
of a legally recognized marriage in addition to the emotional benefit of
sharing their lives with the person they love the most, same-sex or gay
couples are denied these most fundamental benefits. 10
Historically, the right to regulate marriage has been exercised by most
civilizations.'1 In our nation, regulation of marriage traditionally has
been governed by state law. 12 States possess the power to prescribe vari-
ous formal and substantive requirements for marriage. 3 However, be-
cause the United States Supreme Court holds the right to marry as
fundamental, 4 such regulations are subject to federal constitutional
restraints.
15
The fundamental right to marry encompasses interracial marriages, as
recognized in Loving v. Virginia.'6 In Loving, the Supreme Court held
UNITED STATES § 7.1, at 423-25 (2d ed. 1987) (citing numerous statutes that place support
obligations on both spouses); supra note 5 and accompanying text (providing further ex-
amples of benefits provided to the marital unit).
9. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (indicating a close definitional
relationship between marriage and procreation); Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869) (holding
that interracial marriages do not fall under the traditional definition of marriage); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding that same-sex marriages are not permissible
forms of marriage), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1191 (Wash. Ct. App.) (indicating that same-sex couples do not fall under the definition of
marriage), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
10. The phrase gay marriage or same-sex marriage, as used in this Comment, refers to
both gay and lesbian marriages. See WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DIc'rION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 587 (1989) (defining "gay" as a homosexual person,
particularly a male) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]; id. at 822 (defining "lesbian" as a homosex-
ual relationship between women). Strictly speaking, homosexuality is the exhibition of
"sexual desire ... toward a person ... of one's own sex." Id. at 680; see Ingram, supra
note 4, at 34 n.6 (discussing the definition of homosexual).
11. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) ("The right to regulate marriage ... has
been assumed and exercised by every civilized and Christian nation.").
12. See, e.g., Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105,107 (D. Nev. 1980) (stating the individ-
ual states have the power to regulate marriage); O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (discussing the power of states to regulate the institution of marriage);
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) ("The power to regulate marriage is a sover-
eign function reserved exclusively to the respective states.").
13. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Katz, 318 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1974); KRAUSE, supra note 5, at
1-80 (discussing various historical and contemporary state regulations of marriage).
14. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1978); Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).
15. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) ("The Consti-
tution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about
family and parenthood."); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374 (indicating that the right to marry is
fundamental and any regulation implicating marriage is subject to strict scrutiny analysis);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state marriage statutes prohibiting inter-
racial marriages are unconstitutional).
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving, a white man and a black woman, married in the
District of Columbia, returned to the state of Virginia. Id. at 2. Upon returning, the
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antimiscegenation' 7 laws violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.' 8 Prior state cases had upheld an-
timiscegenation statutes as avoiding the production of "evil, and evil only,
without any corresponding good,"' 9 or as preventing unions "distasteful
to our people., 20 Although similar rationales are advanced to preclude
the recognition of gay marriages, 2' courts have been unwilling to extend
the umbrella of constitutional protection to same-sex couples.22 As our
legal system encompasses and protects a larger and larger segment of
human relationships, same-sex marriages are conspicuously absent.23
This Comment explores the constitutional dimensions of the right to
same-sex marriage. Initially, this Comment examines the historical reluc-
tance of state and federal courts and state legislatures to extend the guar-
antee of the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples. After
laying this foundation, this Comment discusses past and current judicial
definitions of marriage and the notable control states have over marriage.
Next, this Comment considers the constitutional implications of the right
couple was arrested and prosecuted under the state's antimiscegenation statute. Id. at 2-3.
The couple plead guilty and were sentenced to a year in jail. Id. at 3. The sentence was
completely suspended if the couple did not return to the state for 25 years. Id. The couple
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which overturned the convictions. Id. at 12.
17. "Miscegenation" is defined as "marriage or cohabitation between a man and wo-
man of different races, esp., in the U.S., between a Negro and a white person." See WEB-
STER'S, supra note 10, at 915.
18. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
19. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869). The defendant challenged a Georgia statute
that made any marriage between a black person and a white person a felony. Id. The
court upheld the conviction based on its finding that the traditional definition of marriage
precluded couples of different races. Id. at 323.
20. Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 300 (1871). The defendant was prosecuted for violat-
ing a Tennessee statute making interracial marriage a felony. Id. The court upheld the
conviction based on the traditional definition of marriage as a union between persons of
the same race. Id. at 299-311.
21. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 44-55.
22. See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 9 (1991) (arguing for an acceptance of same-sex marriages); James Trosino,
American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV.
93 (1993) (stating the thesis that the reasons articulated for the unconstitutionality of an-
timiscegenation statutes should apply with equal force to same-sex marriages); see also
Thomas Stoddard & Bruce Fein, Gay Marriage: Should Homosexual Marriages be Recog-
nized Legally?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 42-43 (debating whether same-sex marriages
should be legalized).
23. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protecting the ex-
tended family as distinct from the nuclear family); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(recognizing interracial marriages); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)
(extending New York's eviction law to cover same-sex couples cohabitating and defining
them as families for purposes of the statute); WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH & SANFORD N.
KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 431 (1983) (indicating that our legal system
increasingly is recognizing more nontraditional human relationships).
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to same-sex marriage. This Comment goes on to address the question
whether same-sex marriage is a fundamental right or suspect classifica-
tion for due process and equal protection analysis. Additionally, this
Comment considers an intermediate level of scrutiny for same-sex mar-
riages under the heading of sex discrimination. Subsequently, this Com-
ment explicates and critiques various reasons articulated by states for
their prohibition on same-sex marriages. This Comment concludes that
as the concept of marriage evolved to encompass interracial marriages as
a constitutionally protected fundamental right, so should it continue to
progress to recognize same-sex marriages.
I. STATE STEWARDSHIP OVER MARRIAGE
Domestic relations, including marriage, historically are within the prov-
ince of state law, not federal statutory or constitutional law.24 State regu-
lation of marriage, however, must conform to federal constitutional
limitations.25 Accordingly, the state may substantially infringe upon the
fundamental right to marry only for compelling reasons.2 6 The state may
impose "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with de-
cisions to enter into the marital relationship."27 The motivating force be-
24. See Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D. Nev. 1980) (indicating marriage
regulation has historically been a function of state law); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58-59
(Haw. 1993) (same); see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kin-
ship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L. REV.
463, 470 (1983) (stating that domestic relations have been traditionally the exclusive do-
main of state law); Ingram, supra note 4, at 37 (addressing the issue of whether states can
regulate marriage).
25. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1978); Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-
12; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59. Because the Supreme Court determined that marriage is a fun-
damental right deserving constitutional protection, any state regulation that unreasonably
interferes with a person's right to enter into a marital relationship is subject to strict scru-
tiny. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374-91; Ingram, supra note 4, at 37 (discussing the power of
states to regulate marriage); Mary F. Gardner, Note, Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.: Much
Ado About Nothing?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 361, 363 n.12 (1990) (indicating the Supreme Court
has held the right to marry to be fundamental and the state may not unreasonably interfere
with that right).
26. Salisbury, 501 F. Supp. at 107; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59. Permissible items of regula-
tion include consanguinity (prevention of incest), HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1(1) (1993); limi-
tations on age, id. § 572-2; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:4 (1992); and prevention of
bigamy, HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-1(3) (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-8 (1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-362 (Michie 1988).
27. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. In another context the Court stated "the Constitution
undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the selection of one's
spouse." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). Unfortunately, courts
have been unwilling to extend those constraints to protect same-sex couples. See infra
notes 54-86 and accompanying text.
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hind any regulation that significantly interferes with the marital decision
must be a "sufficiently important state interest." 28
By virtue of its power to regulate marriage, the state has the authority
to determine the elements of a valid marriage contract, to control the
qualifications for marriage and the forms and procedures necessary
to finalize the marriage, to establish the rights and duties that marriage
creates, and to prescribe the requirements for marital dissolution.2 9
While at one time states had an "absolute right to prescribe the con-
ditions upon which . . . marriage . . . shall be created,"3 this right is
no longer absolute.3 Thus, the modern trend has been for states
to move away from excessive regulation of marriage.3 2  Similarly,
states historically have claimed the right to regulate marriage in
order to protect general societal goals;33 however, this laudable goal
28. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
29. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1(7) (indicating that a valid marriage is condi-
tioned on "[t]he marriage ceremony be[ing] performed in the State by a person ... with a
valid license"); 48 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1 (1991); see Ingram, supra note 4, at 37-39
(addressing the issue of whether the state can regulate marriage); Lenore J. Weitzman,
Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (1974) (discuss-
ing the historical evolution of state regulation of marriage).
30. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977).
31. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that states may not
prohibit interracial marriages); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (stating that
the right of states' to regulate marriage is subject to federal constitutional limitations);
KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 230-45 (discussing the inevitable involvement of the federal gov-
ernment in states regulation of marriage); Ingram, supra note 4, at 37-39 (discussing state
regulation of marriage).
32. While states fight to assert their rights to regulate the institution of marriage in
order to prohibit same-sex marriages, the same states are decreasing legislative and judicial
regulation of marriage and broadening the definition of those who have the capacity to
marry. See KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 39-41 (indicating that more states are reducing or
eliminating numerous restrictions or prohibitions on marriage); WEYRAUCH & KATZ,
supra note 23, at 352 (indicating that age requirements for marriage are lower, mental
competence to marry is assumed, and interracial marriage is permitted).
33. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (stating that "marriage... [has]
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution"); Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (indicating that "[u]pon [marriage] society
may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations"),
overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 31
(Cal. 1948) (Carter, J., concurring) (indicating that the prohibition of interracial marriages
is not a valid regulation because "that ... marriage cannot be considered vitally detrimen-
tal to the public health, welfare and morals"); Fearon v. Treanor, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (N.Y.
1936) (indicating that marriage "constitutes an institution involving the highest interests of
society. It is regulated and controlled by law based upon principles of public policy affect-
ing the welfare of the people of the state"). See generally Weitzman, supra note 29, at
1242-43.
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appears to lack the compelling nature required to pass constitutional
analysis.34
II. THE Two FACES OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRIAGE
A. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
The United States Supreme Court "has long recognized that freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."35 The Supreme Court first characterized the right to marry as
fundamental in Skinner v. Oklahoma.36 In Skinner, the right to marry
was linked to the right to procreate and rear children.37 The right to pro-
create, and consequently the right to marry, were seen by the Court as
fundamental pillars of society.38
The right to marry was first characterized as "the most important rela-
tion in life" in Maynard v. Hill.39 Subsequently, the Court recognized the
right "to marry, establish a home and [raise] children" as a pivotal part of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.4" In Griswold v. Con-
necticut,41 the Court perceived the marriage relationship as an association
34. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (indicating the need for a
compelling state interest to legitimate any regulation infringing upon the right to marry);
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (characterizing marriage as a fundamental right that requires a
compelling state interest for any regulation to infringe upon).
35. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
36. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The dispute before the Court arose out of an Oklahoma
statute that permitted the state to sterilize habitual criminals without their consent. Id.
The petitioner was convicted for crimes ranging from chicken stealing to armed robbery
between 1926 and 1936. Id. at 537. Consequently, the state Attorney General brought
proceedings against the petitioner under the sterilization statute. Id. Holding the statute
unconstitutional, the Court determined that "Im]arriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541. The Court found that to deprive




39. 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). The Maynard Court viewed marriage as "the foundation
of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor pro-
gress." Id. at 211.
40. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-44 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); La Fleur, 414
U.S. at 639-40; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 190.
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1994]
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"intimate to the degree of being sacred., 42  With each of these cases the
Court laid a piece of the foundation ultimately leading to the recognition
of the right to marry as fundamental.43
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized marriage as a fundamental
right in Zablocki v. Redhail.44 In Zablocki, the Court held that the fun-
damental right to privacy subsumed the right to marry, therefore requir-
ing strict scrutiny review of any statute implicating the institution of
marriage.45 The Court found the institution of marriage to be deeply
rooted in our nation's tradition and collective conscience and "'essential
42. Id. at 486.
43. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978).
44. Id. at 384. Zablocki involved a Wisconsin statute prohibiting any Wisconsin resi-
dent with minor children not in his custody and which he is under an obligation to support,
from obtaining a marriage license until the resident demonstrated to a court that he was in
compliance with his child support obligations. Id. at 375-76. Holding the statute violative
of the United States Constitution, the Court stated that the right to marry was fundamen-
tal. Id. at 386. Because of this fundamental character, the Court utilized a strict scrutiny
standard of review. Id. at 388-91. In applying strict scrutiny review, the Court saw the
statute as underinclusive because it failed to account for other fathers who failed to meet
their child support obligations due to other financial difficulties. Id.
Marriage also has been defined as a fundamental right by state courts. See, e.g., Perez v.
Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 18-19 (Cal. 1948) (describing "marriage [as] ... a fundamental right
of free men"); Zavala v. City of Denver, 759 P.2d 664, 673 (Colo. 1988) (indicating the
right to marry is fundamental in the State of Colorado); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55
(Haw. 1993) (stating that the Hawaii constitution "encompasses all of the fundamental
rights expressly recognized as being subsumed within the privacy protections of the United
States Constitution").
45. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; see also Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55 (supporting the Zablocki
Court's reasoning and holding). The right of privacy arises out of the doctrine of substan-
tive due process, which emanates from the precepts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4, at 369, 374-75 (4th ed. 1991). These Amendments provide
that neither the federal government nor individual state governments shall deprive any
individual of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. These Amendments authorize judicial examination of the ade-
quacy of legal procedure, or procedural due process, under federal and state law. See De-
velopments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1166
(1980) [hereinafter Constitution and the Family]. In contrast to procedural due process,
substantive due process focuses on governmental deprivations of certain specified funda-
mental rights or governmental actions toward certain suspect classifications regardless of
the procedural mechanisms used. Id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, § 11.4, at 374-
75. Substantive due process utilizes a heightened standard of judicial review when certain
fundamental rights are implicated. Id. § 11.4, at 370-71. The Supreme Court usually uses a
rational basis test when scrutinizing the substance, as opposed to the procedure, of federal
or state law. Id. at 374. Under the rational basis test, the government merely must estab-
lish that the legislation in question is rationally related to a legitimate governmental inter-
est. Id. In contrast, the Court employs strict scrutiny when fundamental rights or suspect
classifications are involved. Id. In this case, the legislation will be upheld only if it is
narrowly tailored to protect a substantial or compelling state interest. Id. at 375; see In-
gram, supra note 4, at 39-40 (discussing the elements of substantive due process analysis).
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to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' "46 Zablocki repre-
sented the culmination of a long evolutionary process in the Supreme
Court's understanding of the right to marry.
B. The Coupling of the Fundamental Right to Marry With Procreation
and Child-Rearing
In recognizing the right to marry as fundamental, the Supreme Court
sometimes premises the essential nature of that right on the concepts of
child-rearing and procreation.47 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,48 the Court de-
termined that the dual rights of marriage and procreation are "fundamen-
tal to the very existence and survival of the race."49 This determination
focused on the relationship between marriage and child-rearing; the
union of two individuals in love, sharing their lives in compassion, does
The right to privacy was first recognized in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra, § 14.27, at 760. Griswold involved a Connecticut statute prohibiting the
use of contraceptives by married couples. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. In finding the statute
unconstitutional, the Court laid the parameters for determining what constitutes a funda-
mental right-those rights that implicate the fundamental principles of ordered liberty and
the collective traditions and conscience of our people. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring). The majority, not utilizing these two elements, held that several of the Bill of Rights
guarantees protect privacy interests and create a penumbra of privacy. Id. at 484 (majority
opinion). Accordingly, the Court determined the very idea of police searching the "sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms" for signs of contraceptive use are "repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Id. at 485-86; see NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra, § 14.26, at 757-816 (providing a general discussion of the right to privacy).
46. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); see supra
note 44.
47. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56 (indicating that the Zablocki
holding was limited to heterosexual marriages because of the Supreme Court's linking of
marriage and procreation and child rearing); Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An
Analysis of Battered Woman's Syndrome Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who
Kill Abusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1379, 1414 (1993) (stating that the Supreme
Court continually links procreation and marriage); Mary N. Cameli, Note, Extending Fam-
ily Benefits to Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 447, 448 (1992) (indi-
cating that the Supreme Court continually views marriage through the procreation
spectrum); Comment, Homosexuals' Right To Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legisla-
tive Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 200-02 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, Homosexuals'
Right].
Procreation and child-rearing are not the only reasons espoused by courts in recognizing
the right to marry as fundamental. See infra notes 107-34 and accompanying text. How-
ever, procreation and child-rearing have been used by courts to regulate which associations
the fundamental right to marry encompasses. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
Procreation and child-rearing are therefore the linch-pin issue in same-sex marriage cases.
48. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. Id. at 541. In another case, the Court indicated a similar connection between mar-
riage and procreation, stating that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
denotes the freedom to marry, establish a home, and bring up children. Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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not by itself create the fundamental right to marry. If the coupling of
marriage and procreation alone creates the fundamental right to marry, °
then marriage without child-rearing and procreation does not merit con-
stitutional protection as a fundamental right.5 '
Zablocki, Skinner, and their predecessors and progeny are the consti-
tutional lexicon through which all same-sex marriage cases are decided.52
State courts unequivocally follow the Supreme Court's coupling of mar-
riage and procreation first articulated in Maynard and later solidified in
Zablocki.53
C. Judicial Intransigence Toward Expansion Of The Definition of
Marriage
Since 1971, a number of litigants have attempted to challenge the con-
stitutionality of laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. 4 In rejecting each
50. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384-86. The Court stated:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level
of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and
family relationships .... [I]f appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it
must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the [s]tate... allows
sexual relations legally to take place.
Id. at 386.
51. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-56; see also Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish,
Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordi-
nances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1181 (1992) (indicating that the Supreme Court continu-
ally links procreation and marriage together); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note
47, at 200-02 (articulating the view that the Zablocki holding is limited to heterosexual
couples); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 578-79 (1973)
(indicating that the Supreme Court continually connects marriage and procreation) [here-
inafter Note, Legality].
52. This Comment coins and uses the phrase "Zablocki lexicon" to refer to the United
States Supreme Court's persistent joining of marriage and procreation or child-rearing into
a single definition. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-87 (discussing procreation or child-rear-
ing as an important element of marriage); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-57 (discussing the propen-
sity of the Supreme Court to define marriage in conjunction with procreation). In
analyzing the fundamental right to marry this fact is essential. See Trosino, supra note 22,
at 111-16 (chronicling various same-sex marriage cases and courts' continual dependence
on the Supreme Court's definition of marriage as the logical predicate of procreation).
53. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (indicating the close relation-
ship between marriage and child rearing); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-56; Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
54. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), affd, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1381 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1992); Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 588; Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); In re Estate of Cooper,
149 Misc. 2d 282 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. 1990), affd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1993); De Santo v.
Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Slayton v. State, 633 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d.
1008 (1974).
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of these claims, courts have relied consistently on the definition of a mar-
riage as the union of a man and woman or on the integral relationship
between marriage and procreation.55 For courts, the terms same-sex mar-
riage or gay marriage are unprecedented oxymorons because of their un-
founded belief that same-sex couples are incapable of procreation. 6
One of the initial cases contesting the ban on gay marriages was Baker
v. Nelson.57 In that case, Richard Baker and James McConnell applied
for a marriage license from the clerk at their local Minnesota court-
house.58 They were denied the license because they were of the same sex;
subsequently they filed suit, contesting this denial.59 In rejecting their
argument, the court relied on the traditional definition of marriage as the
union between persons of the opposite sex.6" The court invoked tradi-
tional principles reminiscent of Zablocki by stating that the union of a
man and a woman for procreation and child rearing are indispensable
elements of the marriage institution.6"
The next case challenging the legality of the ban on same-sex marriages
was Singer v. Hara.62 The plaintiffs, two males, challenged Washington
State's refusal to issue them a marriage license.63 The court upheld the
refusal to issue the marriage license by relying upon the "Zablocki lexi-
con" to define marriage: the intimate relationship between the marriage
and procreation or child rearing.
64
55. See supra note 51; see also Trosino, supra note 22, at 111-16. The author discusses
courts' reluctance to expand the definition of marriage beyond its traditional meaning of a
union between a man and a woman. Id.
56. See WEYRAUCH, supra note 23, at 430 (discussing the penchant of courts to view
the concept of same-sex marriage as absurd); infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text
(discussing adoption, surrogate motherhood, and artificial insemination as viable means of
conception for same-sex couples).
57. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
58. Id. at 185.
59. Id. The Minnesota statute that governed marriage within the state when the suit
was commenced contained neither an express provision denying same-sex couples the right
to marry nor a provision limiting marriage to heterosexual couples. See id. at 185-88 (dis-
cussing MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.01-.08 (West 1971)).
60. Id. at 186. The court added that "the present statute is replete with words of heter-
osexual import such as 'husband and wife' and 'bride and groom.' " Id. (quoting MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 517).
61. Id.; see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
62. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d. 1008 (1974).
63. Id. at 1188.
64. Id. at 1192. The court stated:
[A]ppellants are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of
their sex; rather, they are being denied entry into the marriage relationship be-
cause of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which may be en-
tered into only by two persons who are members of the opposite sex.
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In both Baker and Singer the respective state statutes neither limited
marriage to heterosexual couples nor prohibited gay marriages.65 In both
cases however, the courts interpreted the applicable statute as implicitly
limiting the right to marry to heterosexual couples.6 6 Both courts deter-
mined that the use of words such as husband and wife or person or indi-
vidual, limited state sanctioned marriage to heterosexual couples.67 In
Id. Implicit in the Singer court's continual reference to marriage as the union of a man and
a woman is the notion that marriage has primarily a procreative function which same-sex
couples are incapable of satisfying. See id. at 1189, 1191-92, 1195.
65. Id. at 1189. In Singer the applicable statute provided:
"Marriage is a civil contract which may be entered into by persons of the age of
eighteen years, who are otherwise capable: Provided, That every marriage en-
tered into in which either party shall not have attained the age of seventeen years
shall be void except where this section has been waived by a superior court judge
of the county in which the female resides on a showing of necessity."
Id. at 1189 n.2 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1970)).
Similarly, the Minnesota statute at issue in Baker provided no explicit statutory limita-
tion mandating either that only heterosexual marriages would receive state recognition or
that same-sex marriages were banned. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185-86 (citing MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 517.01-.08). The Minnesota Code now defines marriage as the union of a
man and a woman, but still fails to explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 517.01 (1990); see Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 194-96 (dis-
cussing various cases challenging prohibitions to same-sex marriage).
Most state marital statutes are either gender neutral or contain no specific provisions
that either limit marriage to heterosexual couples or prohibit same-sex marriages. See, e.g.,
HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 572-1, -6 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.01-.08 (1990); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1304 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1986). See Ingram, supra
note 4, at 44-45 (discussing how state courts and legislatures have dealt with same-sex
marriages); Heidi A. Sorensen, Note, A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Inter-
pretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 81 GEo. L.J. 2105, 2105-06 (1993) (dis-
cussing the District of Columbia's marriage statute and its lack of any prohibition against
same-sex marriages or any requirement that the partners be members of the opposite sex).
Some states, however, explicitly prohibit same-sex marriages. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46a-81r (Supp. 1993) (indicating that certain statutory provisions are not to be
construed to permit same-sex marriages); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 1990) ("Per-
sons of the same sex may not contract marriage with each other."); MAss. GEN. L. ch.
151B, §§ 1, 3, 4 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, :2 (1992); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 1.01 (West 1993) ("A license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same
sex."); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1990) ("A marriage between persons of the same
sex is prohibited."). See Ingram, supra note 4, at 38 (indicating most state statutes do not
expressly prohibit same-sex marriages); Trosino, supra note 22, at 96 n.23 (stating that most
state marriage statutes do not explicitly prohibit same-sex marriages).
66. See Trosino, supra note 22, at 111-16; Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note
47, at 194-96. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Baker, viewed the situation through the
Zablocki lexicon, stating that marriage is uniquely involved in the activities of procreation
and child rearing. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972); see supra note 52 (explaining the phrase Zablocki lexicon).
67. See supra notes 56-63. In defining these terms, courts look to their traditional
understanding, found in Webster's Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary, and the Zablocki
lexicon. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1111 (1982); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,55-57 (Haw. 1993); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
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neither of these cases did the courts consider assigning a non-sex or gen-
der specific role to these terms.68
In 1984, a state court once again maintained a hard line, traditional
definition of marriage.69 In De Santo v. Barnsley,7 Mr. De Santo filed a
divorce decree against Mr. Barnsley, claiming the couple had a common-
law same-sex marriage.71 Mr. Barnsley denied the existence of the com-
mon-law marriage.72 The court denied the divorce decree, relying on
588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d
499, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 953-55 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984); see also supra note 52 (discussing the phrase Zablocki lexicon).
68. A nongender or sex-specific role is meant to reach beyond a superficial under-
standing of the terms involved (husband and wife) and define the terms, for legal purposes,
more along the lines of roles and characteristics. These characteristics might well include
the gender or sex of the individual involved, but the definition would also include other
properties, such as the functions undertaken in the home or in society by each partner, the
respective roles of the individuals in the relationship, and so forth. See generally Cox,
supra note 5, at 4, 8-11 (applying various elements of the judicial definition of the word
family to alternative families); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46
U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992) (discussing the similarities between same-sex and heterosex-
ual relationships); Gardner, supra note 25, at 370 n.45 (discussing various elements courts
and commentators use to define the term family for legal purposes). Just as the judicial
definition of family at times transcends the traditional or dictionary definition of that term,
so too may courts go beyond the traditional or dictionary definition of terms such as hus-
band, wife, spouse, or marriage. See Constitution and the Family, supra note 45, at 1156;
Gardner, supra note 25, at 371-81.
One commentator has indicated that "[tIhe problems judges encounter in dealing with a
theory of homosexual marriage are related to language." WEYRAUCH & KATZ, supra note
23, at 430 (emphasis added). Prior case law has focused on a common-usage definition of
marriage, relying on sources such as Webster's. Id. However, "Webster's ... is not neces-
sarily concerned with the question whether a particular usage [of a term] is constitutionally
objectionable, or even discriminatory." Id. For courts, viewing terms such as marriage,
homosexuality, husband, or wife in a nontraditional setting is a conundrum of immense
proportions.
69. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 953-54.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 952-54. Common-law marriages are not entered into under sanction of a
state statutory provision or religious ceremony; instead, they are recognized by the state as
existing due to the length and closeness of the relationship between the individuals in-
volved. Id. at 954. Because of this closeness, a de facto marriage arises in the eyes of the
state. See, e.g., In re Estate of Manfredi, 159 A.2d 697, 700-01 (Pa. 1960). Black's Law
Dictionary defines common law marriage as containing the following: "a positive mutual
agreement, permanent and exclusive of all others, to enter into a marriage relationship,
cohabitation sufficient to warrant a fulfillment of necessary relationship of man and wife,
and an assumption of marital duties and obligations." BLACK'S LAW DIc-rONARY 277 (6th
ed. 1990).
72. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 952.
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traditional definitions of marriage found in dictionaries and case law.7 3
As in previous cases, the court narrowly defined the union of marriage to
heterosexual couples even though Pennsylvania's marriage law did not
define marriage, nor did the court have any case law that specifically
stated that marriage was limited to two persons of the opposite sex.74
Most recently, in Baehr v. Lewin,75 several same-sex couples were de-
nied marriage licenses because the couples were of the same sex.7 6 The
Hawaii Supreme Court, relying on the Zablocki lexicon,77 held that peti-
tioners had no fundamental right to a gay marriage. 78 The court relied on
this traditional definition of marriage to construe the state marriage stat-
ute narrowly as implicitly prohibiting same-sex marriages.79 Similarly,
other courts insist on assuming that marriage is the logical predicate of
procreation, thereby limiting marriage to heterosexual couples.
80
Although a majority of state marital statutes fail to prohibit gay mar-
riages explicitly or limit marriage to heterosexual couples,"l courts con-
tinue to recognize such a limitation implicitly.8 2 By identifying marriage
with procreation, the equation " 'straight is to gay as [marriage] is to no
marriage' " concedes the entire domain of marriage to heterosexuality.83
While courts are willing to construe the meaning of numerous statutory
73. Id. at 953-54 & 954 n.1. The De Santo court quotes the definition of marriage from
Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary as well as from case law defining mar-
riage as integrally intertwined with procreation. Id.
74. Id. at 954. The court took this traditional approach to the definition of marriage
even though later in the opinion the court stated that "the law should take into account
changes in social relationships." Id. at 955.
75. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In Baehr, several homosexual and lesbian couples were
denied marriage licenses from the state. Id. at 48-49. The Baehr court held that under
Article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution, the petitioners might have a claim for sex
discrimination (citing HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5). Id. at 59. Nonetheless, the court held that
same-sex couples do not have a fundamental right to marry. Id. at 57. The court deter-
mined, however, that gender is a suspect category under the Hawaii Constitution, thereby,
invoking strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 66-67. Moreover, the court stated that "[t]he equal
protection clauses of the United States and Hawaii Constitutions are not mirror images of
one another." Id. at 59. The Hawaii Constitution specifically prohibits state-sanctioned
discrimination against a person based on that person's gender. Id. at 59-60. The court
remanded the case for further determinations consistent with its holding. Id. at 68.
76. Id. at 44-52.
77. Id. at 55-57; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
78. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-57. The court viewed the right at issue as the right to a gay
marriage rather than the right to marriage. Id. However, the court challenged the state
ban on gay marriage under an equal protection analysis. Id. at 57-68.
79. Id. at 48 nn.1-2, 55-57.
80. Id. at 56; supra note 54.
81. See supra note 65; see also Ingram, supra note 4, at 44-45.
82. See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
83. KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 210 (1991) (dis-
cussing various attributes of lesbian and gay families).
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and constitutional terms broadly, this willingness has not been extended
to defining marriage to include same-sex couples.84 State and federal
courts persist in defining marriage as an outgrowth of procreation and
child rearing, thereby limiting marriage to heterosexual couples.85 The
spirit of the Loving decision has battled judicial intransigence head on
and lost in the arena of same-sex marriage.86
III. THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE: PROCREATION AND CHILD
REARING AS A "Two WAY STREET"
A. Application of the Procreation and Child Rearing Definition of
Marriage to Same-Sex Couples
Although courts persist in defining marriage and procreation or child
rearing as logical corollaries of one another,87 such a definition does not
necessarily preclude gay marriages.88 Procreation or child rearing are not
necessarily the defining characteristics of a traditional marriage; rather,
such a limiting characteristic is grossly underinclusive.89
The right to marry and the right to procreate or raise children were
made logical predicates of one another by the Supreme Court's linkage of
the two in Zablocki v. Redhail.9° Most other courts have followed a
84. See supra note 47. The United States Constitution is interpreted as including a
right to privacy, the right to an abortion, the right to procreation, and numerous other
nontextual rights. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, §§ 14.26-.30, at 757-816.
85. While courts continue to premise the constitutional right to marry on an insepara-
ble relationship between marriage and procreation or child rearing, such that the right to
marry is constitutionally protected because of this relationship, this definition does not
necessarily preclude including same-sex marriages within the scope of constitutional pro-
tection. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 35; see also infra notes 99-104, 108-20, 134-36.
86. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text; infra notes 162-87 and accompany-
ing text.
87. See supra notes 47-79 (discussing how courts join the fundamental right to marry
with child-rearing or procreation and the propensity of courts dealing with same-sex mar-
riage cases to follow the same line of reasoning).
88. See generally Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy:
Abandoning Scriptural, Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35
How. L.J. 173 (1992) (discussing the need to and feasibility of expanding the definition of
marriage beyond that of the traditional family); see also Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal
Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of
"Family", 29 J. FAM. L. 497 (1990-91) (discussing the need to recognize the large number
of same-sex couples).
89. See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 4, at 46-47.
90. 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (indicating that marriage has been placed on the same
level as "procreation, childbirth, and child-rearing"); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56
(Haw. 1993) (same); see supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text. See generally NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 14.28, at 763-70 (discussing the holding in several right to
marry cases).
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similar line of reasoning.9' In many marriages however, the husband and
wife have no children, do not plan on having children, or are incapable of
having children. 92 If the rationale for nonrecognition of same-sex mar-
riages revolves around issues of procreation and child rearing then this
categorization is grossly underinclusive and discriminatory.93
Heterosexual couples who have passed their childbearing years, who
are impotent, sterile or infertile, use contraceptives on a regular basis, or
simply do not want children are permitted to marry94 and receive the
concomitant benefits of marriage. 95 Such heterosexual couples without
children are similarly situated to same-sex couples, and because the right
to marry is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny,96 prohibitions on
same-sex marriages linked to procreation would appear to be invalid. 97 If
the true rationale for denying gay couples the right to marry is the in-
termeshing of marriage and procreation, then statutes preventing hetero-
sexual couples, who cannot have or do not want children, from receiving
the benefits of marriage are legitimate and logical. 98 Notably, courts re-
fuse to extend the marriage-procreation reasoning to deny certain heter-
osexuals a right to marry. 99
91. See supra notes 54-80 (discussing contemporary case law dealing with same-sex
marriages and courts continually defining marriage along the lines of procreation).
92. See WEYRAUCH & KATZ, supra note 23, at 352. The authors discuss the question-
able relationship between marriage and procreation and assert that the long association of
marriage and procreation is no longer valid in today's world. Id. Today, numerous chil-
dren are born outside of wedlock, and marriage serves other functions such as emotional
support and financial stability. See CLARK, supra note 8, § 2.1, at 74.
93. See Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (indicating that indi-
viduals may marry one another even though they are unable to have children); Joseph
Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 344
(1949) (discussing the evolution and application of the Equal Protection Clause and indi-
cating that an underinclusive law would violate the Clause by not treating "similarly those
similarly situated").
94. See, e.g., Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 269; Ingram, supra note 4, at 46-47.
95. See supra note 5.
96. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1978). Strict scrutiny requires any
challenged regulation to be narrowly tailored to meet a substantial or compelling state
interest. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 11.4, at 371.
97. See supra note 44.
98. See generally Ingram, supra note 4, at 47 (discussing the irrationality of permitting
heterosexual couples incapable of having children to benefit from the institution of mar-
riage while denying the same right to same-sex couples).
99. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1939), overruled by
Means v. Industrial Comm'n, 515 P.2d 29 (Ariz. 1973) (indicating that the inability to have
children is not a statutory ground for an annulment); Linneman v. Linneman, 116 N.E.2d
182 (Il1. App. Ct. 1953) (same); see also Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div.
1948) (stating that the inability to have children is not a bar to marriage); Ingram, supra
note 4, at 47.
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Therefore, the marriage-procreation link is discriminatorily applied
with the purpose, or at least the effect, of discriminating against same-sex
couples. This discrimination lacks justification because gay married
couples can procreate and rear children as well. Same-sex couples have
the viable options of artificial insemination,'" the use of a surrogate
mother, 01 or adoption. 0 2 Numerous heterosexual couples use such pro-
cedures and so may same-sex couples.' 0 3 Same-sex couples utilizing such
100. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (permitting a lesbian to adopt
her partner's child); Holly Metz, Branching Out: Defining Today's Family is More than a
Relative Matter, Student Law., Oct. 1993, at 23, 26 (discussing the perils an artificially in-
seminated lesbian couple experienced when attempting to have one of the partners adopt
their child).
101. See, e.g., Surrogate Parent Agreements Held Valid Under California Law, 61
U.S.L.W. 1177, - (U.S. June 1, 1993) (discussing California's acceptance of surrogate-
motherhood); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1993); Ingram, supra note 4, at 47; George Keider, Lesbian Wins Approval to Adopt Part-
ner's Child, N.J. LAWYER, Aug. 16, 1993, at 1. See generally Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799
(Va. 1981) (holding that a gay parent may have visitation rights with his child); FREDERICK
W. BOZETr, GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS (1987) (discussing adoptive and foster gay par-
ents, gay fathers, and gay stepparent families); William A. Henry III, Gay Parents: Under
Fire and On the Rise, TIME, Sept. 20, 1993, at 66 (discussing the perils of a lesbian couple in
attempting to see one partner's son and similar obstacles encountered by other same-sex
couples).
102. See, e.g., J.M.G., 632 A.2d at 550; Keider, supra note 101, at 1. In J.M.G., New
Jersey Superior Court Judge Philip J. Freedman stated that the child, who was being
adopted by the female partner of her mother, "w[ould] [be] provide[d] critical legal rights
and protections for her safety as well as her physical and emotional well-being." J.M.G.,
632 A.2d at 551. Moreover, the court noted, the adoption would provide additional eco-
nomic security, the right to support and inheritancy, health insurance as a dependant of
J.M.G., and the continuity of the relationship. Id. at 551-52. Lastly, the court stated that
"the rights of parents cannot be denied, limited, or abridged on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion." Id. at 553. These identical arguments have been asserted in favor of same-sex mar-
riages; however, they have been continually rebuffed. Trends indicate that more courts are
recognizing adoptions by same-sex couples:
[A recent] second-parent adoption ... was reportedly the seventh such adoption
granted to same-sex partners. Judges in San Francisco, Minneapolis, New York,
Los Angeles, and other cities have since granted many requests by lesbian peti-
tioners to adopt their partner's biological children. According to the Lesbian and
Gay Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, more than 100 cases
have succeeded at the trial court level.
Metz, supra note 100, at 26; see also Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 315 (permitting a lesbian part-
ner to adopt the couple's daughter); Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parent-
ing: Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (1989) (discussing barriers
to homosexual adoption).
103. See BOZE-I-, supra note 101, at 168-71 (discussing lesbian couples' use of artificial
insemination); HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 329
(William Paul et al., eds., 1982) (discussing various conception methods open to same-sex
couples); WILLIAM H. MASTERS, ET AL., HUMAN SEXUALITY 146-53 (3d ed. 1988) (listing
and discussing various options for conception); DEBORAH G. WOLF, THE LESBIAN COM-
MUNITY 136-66 (1979) (discussing issues affecting lesbian mothers, including methods of
conception); Stuart A. Sutton, Comment, The Lesbian Family: Rights in Conflict Under
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procedures would have the ability to procreate and raise children,
thereby allowing them to fall within the Zablocki lexicon. °4 Identifying
marriage and procreation together can be a two way street permitting
both gay and heterosexual couples to benefit from the institution of mar-
riage."10 Beyond being able to procreate and raise children, discrimina-
tion against same-sex couples is unjustified because the most fundamental
reason for protecting marriage constitutionally is the freedom of associa-
tion values implicated in marriage. Marriage strengthens and facilitates
the emotional, social, and psychological bonding between two individuals.
B. A "Bilateral Loyalty": Alternative Definitions of Marriage
Defining marriage as a means to procreate and rear children is under-
inclusive."° In Griswold v. Connecticut, °7 the United States Supreme
Court defined marriage as a "way of life," "a harmony in living," "a bilat-
eral loyalty," and an association "intimate to the degree of being sa-
The California Uniform Parentage Act, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1007 (1980) (discuss-
ing artificial insemination, adoption, and fosterage as viable forms of conception for same-
sex couples).
104. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 47 (indicating that procedures such as surrogate moth-
erhood or artificial insemination should allow same-sex couples the chance to procreate);
supra note 52; see also ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HoMOSEXUALITIES: A
STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978) (discussing the homosexual com-
munity and several attributes of homosexual life); BOZETT, supra note 101. Some com-
mentators indicate that "gay relationships often involve the love and intimacy we associate
with idealized heterosexual relationships" and that "warmth, love, friendship, and emo-
tional commitment are extremely important to gay people." Fajer, supra note 68, at 546,
550; see also CITY OF Los ANGELES TASK FORCE ON FAMILY DIVERSITY, FINAL REPORT:
"STRENGTHENING FAMILIES: A MODEL FOR COMMUNITY ACTION" 79 (1988) (indicating
that approximately half of all same-sex relationships are a lifetime commitment) [hereinaf-
ter STRENGTHENING FAMILIES]; Alissa Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134, 135 (1987) (stating that numerous same-sex couples remain
in committed relationships for their whole lives).
105. See ROBERT L. BARRET & BRYON E. ROBINSON, GAY FATHERS 88 (1990) ("Chil-
dren living in families with a homosexual parent present themselves with the same issues
that one would observe in children living in more conventional families."); Ali, supra note
102, at 1009-10 (discussing various methods used by lesbian couples to conceive children);
Elizabeth Zuckerman, Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families:
Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729 (1986) (discussing
second-parent adoption as a means for lesbian couples to create a family unit).
106. See Gardner, supra note 25, at 370 n.45. See generally WEYRAUCH & KATZ, supra
note 23, at 352 ("Procreation is no longer always a primary concern of marriage."); Consti-
tution and the Family, supra note 45, at 1156 (discussing state and Supreme Court case law
dealing with the family and the constitution); Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This Day
Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1802
(1988) (indicating a viable and necessary expansion of the definition of marriage).
107. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see supra note 45 (discussing the facts and holding of the
Griswold Court).
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cred."'1 8 Same-sex couples clearly could meet such a definition of
marriage, thereby, permitting them to share in the constitutional protec-
tion afforded traditional marriages. So protected, same-sex couples could
benefit from not only the legal and economic benefits of marriage, °9 but
also from its emotive benefits. 1 ° Marriage should be defined as a rela-
tionship that is more than just an association primarily for procreative
purposes."1 Instead, the Griswold characterization of marriage should
be adopted." 2 These characteristics are shared by both heterosexual and
homosexual couples. 1 3 So understood, the unions of homosexual and
108. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. In Griswold, the Court defined marriage as:
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or so-
cial projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.
Id. (emphasis added).
One scholar has indicated a change in the role of marriage:
[T]here is the change in the functions of marriage itself which has been going on
for a long time, from the days when it was an economic producing unit ... with
responsibilities for child rearing ... to the present, when its chief functions seem
to be furnishing opportunities for affection, companionship and sexual satisfac-
tion.... [T]he fact is that the most significant function of marriage today seems to
be that it furnishes emotional satisfactions to be found in no other relationships.
CLARK, supra note 8, § 2.1, at 74 (footnote omitted).
109. See supra note 5 (listing several legal benefits granted married couples).
110. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479-86 (providing an historical overview of the Supreme
Court's treatment of marriage and concluding with a definition of marriage that includes
elements beyond mere procreation and child-rearing); Robert J. Drinan, The Loving Deci-
sion and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 358 (1968) (discussing the Loving deci-
sion and marriage as encompassing more than just procreation); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979) (discussing several characteristics of homosexual persons and
legal treatment of homosexuals in the United States).
111. See CLARK, supra note 8, § 2.1, at 74 (indicating that marriage serves numerous
functions beyond procreation). See generally DAVID KNOX, CHOICES IN RELATIONSHIPS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY (1985) (discussing the attributes of
marital relationships).
112. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
113. See LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMO-
NIES (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992) (containing articles by various authors discussing the
early relationship and later marriage of several same-sex couples); JOHN MONEY & ANKE
A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BoY & GIRL 163-64, 234-35 (1972) (stating that homosex-
ual relationships have a tendency to reproduce the patterns of heterosexual relationships);
Fajer, supra note 68, at 544, 546, 550; Trosino, supra note 22, at 109 (discussing similar
attributes of heterosexual and homosexual relationships); Comment, Homosexuals' Right,
supra note 47, at 197-99 (explicating numerous similarities between heterosexual and
same-sex couples); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law,
100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 218 n.51 (1986) ("Intimate homosexual relationships share the
essential characteristics of an intimate heterosexual relationship. ... ) [hereinafter
Supreme Court, 1985 Term].
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heterosexual couples truly are similar.114 Any judicial or legislative ac-
tion that confers the benefits of marriage on one and not the other is
arbitrary and capricious.
115
Marriage is further defined as " 'a partnership to which both partners
bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and ef-
forts.' "116 Perceived in this light, marriage is essentially the joining of
two individuals for economic reasons1 17 and for the creation of an emo-
tional and psychological bond.118 Such a marital relationship is replete
with benefits and values beyond mere procreation and child rearing." 9
These alternative definitions undermine courts' continual focus on the
prominence of the procreative element of marriage. 2 ° While procrea-
tion is an important element of most marriages, it is most assuredly not
the only, nor always the most important, element. 121 Lastly, marriage
may be defined as encompassing "deep attachments and commitments,"
and as a union to share "thoughts, experiences, and beliefs."' 22 Numer-
ous homosexual couples are characterized by all or most of these charac-
114. See Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 197-99. According to one
study:
[H]omosexual and heterosexual bonds share a host of commonalities .... In
particular, the settled-in qualities of the homosexual couple tend to be precisely
those which characterize the stable heterosexual relationship. The similarities ev-
idenced in daily life are especially noticeable. The way the partners interact as
they engage in conversation, the way casual affection is expressed and minor irri-
tations are dealt with, as well as how visitors are treated ... and myriad other
details of everyday life are all more or less indistinguishable. Viewed from this
angle, there are clearly more differences between individuals and individual
couples than there are between kinds of couples.
C. A. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 159 (1975).
115. See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
116. Gussin v. Gussin, 836 P.2d 484, 491 (Haw. 1992) (quoting Cassiday v. Cassiday, 716
P.2d 1133, 1136 (Haw. 1986)).
117. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 35 (discussing the reasons why people marry).
118. Edward Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-A Comment on the Homosexual Chal-
lenge, 5 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 41, 42 (1976).
119. See, e.g., KNOX, supra note 111, at 81-90 (discussing the differences and similarities
between love and procreation); Ingram, supra note 4, at 35-36 (indicating other potential
benefits found in the marital relationship besides procreation).
120. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 35-37, 40-42 (explicating numerous reasons behind the
decision to marry). The author states, as "important as procreation may be to many mar-
riage partners, there are many other important values and benefits which can be realized in
the marital relationship." Id. at 35.
121. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
122. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). The Court espoused
the following definition:
[D]eep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals
with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and
beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. [Relationships] . ..
distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity
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teristics.' 23 Like the Griswold definition, this definition contemplates the
numerous elements found in any marital unit' 2 4 and allows same-sex
couples to profit from the myriad benefits provided to married
couples.
1 25
Attempts to define marriage as the logical predicate 126 of procreation
are underinclusive, 127 given other commonly accepted definitions. 28
Moreover, through the use of such vehicles as surrogate motherhood,
adoption, or invitro-fertilization, same-sex couples may experience pro-
creation and child rearing.' 29 Marriage need not be defined merely as a
logical predicate 130 of procreation. Instead, marriage encompasses nu-
merous other characteristics.' 3 ' Even the dictionary defines marriage as
not necessarily containing a procreative element.' 32 Under any modern
definition of marriage, same-sex couples either fit that definition or they
are capriciously and arbitrarily excluded from enjoying benefits that simi-
larly situated heterosexual couples enjoy.
1 33
in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship.
Id. While the Court offers this definition as applicable to families, it appears to be equally
applicable to the union of marriage. See generally Supreme Court, 1985 Term, supra note
113, at 219 n.51 (indicating the possible application of this definition to homosexual rela-
tionships). Family and marriage are logical extensions of one another and should therefore
be defined and analyzed in conjunction. See infra notes 134-52.
123. See, e.g., Fajer, supra note 68, at 550; Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note
47, at 197-99.
124. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Griswold definition
of marriage); see also Stanford v. McLean Trucking Co., 506 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (E.D.
Tex. 1981) (indicating a modern emphasis on the sentimental and emotional elements of
marriage); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 500-02 (1992) (stating that the fundamental characteristics of marriage include
its permanence and its base in love, affection, and consideration).
125. Note, Legality, supra note 51, at 579-80 (discussing benefits conferred on married
couples); see supra note 5 (listing various benefits provided married couples).
126. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw. 1993).
127. See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 45 and 106-33.
129. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
130. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56.
131. See supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
132. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 10, at 879 (defining marriage as "any close or intimate
association or union"). While this definition is not listed first, it is one of a number of
viable understandings of the term marriage. This Comment supports the position that reli-
ance on a traditional definition of marriage in a legal context fails to fully appreciate the
constitutional issues implicated in same-sex marriage cases. See supra note 68. However,
if a dictionary definition of marriage is to be used, this Webster's definition is not as con-
straining as those traditionally employed by courts.
133. See Lauren Anderson, Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples: Toward A New
Definition of Family, 26 J. FAM. L. 357, 358 (1988); Melton, supra note 88, at 500.
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C. Birds of a Feather Should Flock Together: Marriage and Family a
Definitional Dichotomy?
Just as marriage and procreation have been interpreted by courts as
logical predicates of one another so should family and marriage be inter-
preted. 134 Courts, state legislatures, and city councils have extended the
traditional definition of family to include same-sex couples. 35 If same-
sex couples have the necessary characteristics to qualify as a family for
certain situations, logic dictates that same-sex couples have the right to
consummate that familial relationship with marriage. 36
In Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 137 two gay men lived together for ten
years in the same apartment.13 8 After one of the men died, the other was
134. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989); Metz, supra note 100,
at 23 (discussing the "branching out" of the modern American family); see also Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (discussing marriage as a relationship which
"attend[s] the creation and sustenance of a family"); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888) (stating that marriage is "the foundation of the family"). See generally KNOX, supra
note 111 (discussing generally family and marriage in a single text because of their close
connection); SARAH T. KNOX, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 25 (1941) ("The normal con-
ventional family starts with marriage."); BRYAN STRONG & CHRISTINE DEVAULT, THE
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY EXPERIENCE 5 (5th ed. 1992) ("A family has traditionally been
defined as a married couple."); supra notes 47-86 and accompanying text (discussing the
propensity of courts to define marriage and procreation as part and parcel of one another).
135. See, e.g., Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55; Yorkshire Towers Co. v. Harpster, 510
N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986) (indicating that a homosexual partner was a "de
facto immediate family member of his partner"), rev'd, 538 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988); N.Y.C. Exec. Order No. 48 (Jan. 7, 1993) (stating that "significant changes in our
society have resulted in ... the development of an expanded concept of the family unit");
Gardner, supra note 25, at 361-86. Additionally, numerous state legislatures and city coun-
cils have created domestic partnership ordinances which permit heterosexual and homo-
sexual couples to avail themselves of various legal benefits. See Bowman & Cornish, supra
note 51, at 1164 (discussing the domestic partnership ordinances of various cities). Domes-
tic partnership ordinances illustrate the evolving nature of the family and attempts by vari-
ous governmental institutions to accommodate the expanding family. Id. at 1164-66; see
also NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INSTITUTE, DOMESTIC PARTNER-
SHIP ORGANIZING MANUAL 7-10 (1992) (indicating the definition of family is changing)
[hereinafter ORGANIZING MANUAL]; Anderson, supra note 133, at 367 (stating that "the
judicial system is in flux regarding its notions of what constitutes a 'family' "); Robert L.
Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Ben-
efits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 1067, 1072 (1990) (listing and discuss-
ing numerous domestic partnership ordinances in several cities); Melton, supra note 88, at
497 (discussing the changing definition of family and new statutory and courtroom defini-
tions to deal with this reality).
136. See generally Metz, supra note 100, at 23-29 (discussing the current legal status of
nontraditional families); Eblin, supra note 135, at 1067-72 (discussing discrimination
against same-sex couples and the need to provide these couples with various marital bene-
fits through domestic partnership ordinances).
137. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
138. Id. at 49-50.
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to be evicted from their apartment.139 The court held that the survivor
was protected from eviction under New York's rent-control laws 140 be-
cause the attributes of the couple's relationship qualified them as a fam-
ily.141 There is a logical inconsistency in recognizing a same-sex couple as
constituting a family in certain circumstances while failing to recognize
their relationship as a marriage because the reasons for calling a same-sex
couple a family apply equally when the question is whether this is a
marriage." 2
Some courts and legislatures are willing to acknowledge the realities of
modern family life, but most refuse to extend the same openness to non-
traditional marriages. 1 43 The court in Braschi argued that the definition
of family should be based on emotional and financial interdependence
and commitment.144 The intransigence of courts in the area of marriage
is incongruous with the expanding definition of family, as illustrated by
the Braschi opinion. 1 5 If a family is characterized by such considerations
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Metz, supra note 100, at 24; see also Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53-55 (discussing the
court's view that the same-sex couple shared several attributes with traditional families);
Gardner, supra note 25, at 378-81 (discussing the Braschi holding and its implications for
an expanding definition of marriage).
142. While several states have domestic partnership ordinances that provide numerous
benefits to same-sex couples, this Comment maintains that marriage provides additional
benefits beyond the reach of such ordinances. See supra notes 4, 106-33; see also Eblin,
supra note 135, at 1076-79 (discussing domestic partnership ordinances in New York and
various other states and municipalities). Marriage provides couples with a means to ex-
press their love and compassion in a socially acceptable way, a base for emotional support,
and a ritual right of passage in their evolving relationship. These emotive benefits tran-
scend the various legal benefits provided to married couples, or to same-sex couples
through domestic partnership ordinances. Therefore, this Comment maintains that domes-
tic partnership ordinances are an insufficient middle ground. Contra Comment, Homosex-
uals' Right, supra note 47, at 213-16 (discussing the benefits of "quasi-marital" status for
same-sex couples).
143. See, e.g., Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54 (granting a homosexual eviction rights under
New York eviction law to the apartment he shared with his deceased partner); Gardner,
supra note 25, at 361-86 (same); Metz, supra note 100, at 23-29 (same); Bowman & Cor-
nish, supra note 51, at 1164 (discussing state case law and city ordinances dealing with
same-sex couples); Melton, supra note 88, at 500-508 (same).
144. The Braschi court determined that "sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious
legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of
family life." Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53; see also Metz, supra note 100, at 25 (discussing the
Braschi holding and its implications for same-sex couples).
145. See Melton, supra note 88, at 501-03 (discussing New York's extension of the defi-
nition of family to include same-sex couples for purposes of the city's eviction and rent-
control codes). Numerous courts have expanded the definition of family to meet the reali-
ties of modern life. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ex-
panding the definition of family beyond the nuclear family); Zimmerman v. Burton, 434
N.Y.S.2d 127, 128-29 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (holding that New York's eviction laws protect
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as emotional support, financial intermingling, and commitment, so also
should marriage, an obvious extension of the familial concept, receive the
same characterization.
146
Just as some courts recognize the ever-expanding definition of family,
so also have many city councils.147 Through the vehicle of domestic part-
nership ordinances, cities across the country are beginning to protect the
interests of nontraditional families. 141 In New York City, former Mayor
Edward Koch issued an executive order that defined a domestic partner-
the surviving member of a heterosexual couple when the other partner dies); Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Turner, 503 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (indicating that the
meaning of the word family is dependent on the area of law in which it is being used). See
generally Gardner, supra note 25, at 368-81 (discussing the expanding parameters of the
legal definition of family). See also Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the
Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1280-84 (1980) (discussing recent developments in the area
of family law and how the Constitution affects these developments).
146. Some courts have granted same-sex couples the right to adopt. See supra notes
101-02 and accompanying text. It is paradoxical that same-sex couples may be considered
families in certain situations and allowed to adopt children in others while still remaining
unable to marry. See Kimberly P. Carr, Comment, Allison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the
Best Interests of the Child in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1021 (1992).
147. Numerous city councils have passed domestic partnership ordinances which permit
individuals living together to receive certain legal benefits. See, e.g., LAGUNA BEACH,
CAL., ORDINANCE No. 1230, Ch. 1.12.010-.080 (1992); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN.
CODE §§ 62.1-.8 (1990); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE §§ 4001-4010 (1989);
TAKOMA PARK, MD. CITY CODE 1993-27 § 8B-175(b) (1993) (granting medical benefits to
domestic partners of city employees); Takoma Park, Md. Resolution No. 1993-77 (1993)
(establishing a domestic partnership registry for The City of Takoma Park); MADISON,
Wis., GEN. ORDINANCES § 28.03(2) (1993) (granting protection to alternative families in
the areas of housing and zoning); Bereavement Leave in NYC Extended to Cover Death of
Domestic Partner, 27 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1114 (Aug. 14, 1989); Kathy Bodovitz,
S.F Refines Family Leave Policy, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 1990, at A6 (discussing the broad-
ening of the definition of unpaid family leave by the San Francisco Civil Service Commis-
sion to include domestic partners); Thomas G. Keane, S.F. Domestic Partners Measure
Winning, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1990, at A8 (discussing how the city of San Francisco voted
on Proposition K, a domestic partnership ordinance); Frank Messina, Couples in the Eyes
of the Law: Laguna Beach Ordinance Granting Rights to Gay and Lesbian Partners Takes
Effect, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at B1 (Orange County ed.). See Bowman & Cornish,
supra note 51, at 1188 (discussing various city ordinances dealing with domestic partners);
Eblin, supra note 135, at 1072 (discussing several city domestic partnership ordinances);
Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage Rights, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 101. This
Comment will not discuss in depth the issue of domestic partnership ordinances. The brief
discussion herein is simply meant to reinforce the need to expand the definition of mar-
riage in accordance with the expansion of marriage's "cousin," the family.
148. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 51, at 1189-98 (discussing current domestic
partnership ordinances and proposals); Eblin, supra note 135, at 1072-77 (discussing the
domestic partnership ordinances in Berkeley, California, Seattle, Washington, and several
other cities); see also ORGANIZING MANUAL, supra note 135, at 23-53 (listing and discuss-
ing numerous localities which have adopted domestic partnership ordinances); supra note
142 (setting forth this Comment's opinion that domestic partnership laws are an inade-
quate middle ground for same-sex couples).
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ship as "two people ... who have a close and committed personal rela-
tionship involving shared responsibilities.' 1 49  This executive order
granted bereavement leave to both heterosexual and homosexual couples
when one of the partners dies. 5 ' The City of Laguna Beach, California
also has a domestic partnership ordinance granting city employees in
same-sex relationships, as well as heterosexual couples, medical and den-
tal benefits as well as visitation rights in jails or health-care facilities. 5'
As more and more cities recognize the changing face of the American
family,' 52 courts nonetheless continue to cling to a one-dimensional un-
derstanding of marriage. Marriage and family are logical predicates of
one another just as marriage and procreation, thus the extension of the
definition of family to same-sex couples should be occasioned by the
same extension of the legal definition of marriage.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS
Under current due process' 53 and equal protection analysis, a height-
ened level of judicial scrutiny is employed when a suspect classification' 54
149. N.Y.C. Exec. Order No. 123, § 2 (Aug. 7, 1989) (superseded by N.Y.C. Exec. Or-
der No. 49, § 2 (Jan. 7, 1993)).
150. See id.; Celestine Bohlen, Koch Widens City's Policy on 'Family', N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 1989, at B1.
151. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 51, at 1189-90 (discussing the domestic part-
nership ordinance in Laguna Beach, California); Carla Rivera, Partners of Gays to Receive
City Medical Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at B1 (Orange County ed.).
152. See Melton, supra note 88, at 503-06 (discussing municipalities and the changing
face of the American family); supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
153. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."). Due process and equal protection analyses utilize
a two-tiered approach. See supra note 45. Where a fundamental right or a suspect classifi-
cation is involved, courts require the state regulation be "narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling ... [state] interest." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 11.4, at 371. In
most other situations the court will determine if the regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. Id. § 11.4, at 369-80. In analyzing marriage regulations, it appears
that both an equal protection and a due process evaluation produce identical results. See
id. § 11.4, at 369-70 ("Regardless of whether a court is employing substantive due process
or equal protection analysis, it should use the same standards of review."); Ingram, supra
note 4, at 40 (same); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J.
624, 667-68 (1980) (indicating that equal protection and due process are complementary
doctrines and that the level of review is what is most important). The crucial question is
what level of scrutiny will be used; therefore, this Comment analyzes the equal protection
and due process arguments together. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 40; Jane Rutherford,
The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 72 (1992) (indicating that "substantive due
process often is intertwined with equal protection").
154. Currently the Supreme Court has recognized race, alienage, and national origin as
suspect classifications. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (indicating
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
or fundamental right is implicated by some governmental action. 155
When either of these categories is present the court utilizes a "strict scru-
tiny" standard of review. 56 Strict scrutiny requires the state to choose
means that are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.157
Because marriage is a fundamental right, 58 any regulation substantially
interfering with the right to marry invokes strict scrutiny. 5 9 However,
this is not always the case. Courts continually avoid application of the
strict scrutiny standard by defining the right of marriage to include only
heterosexual couples.
160
A. That "Loving Spirit:" "Marriage" as a Fundamental Right
Traditional equal protection analysis requires "that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.' 61 In Loving v. Virginia,6 2 the United
States Supreme Court determined that two individuals in love are simi-
larly situated as any other two individuals in love, regardless of race.163
However, this rationale has not been extended to recognize that two indi-
viduals in love are similarly situated to any other two individuals in love,
regardless of sexual orientation."
alienage as a suspect classification); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (indicating
that race is a suspect classification deserving strict scrutiny review); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633, 640 (1944) (indicating alienage as a suspect classification); Korematsu v. U.S.,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (indicating national origin as a suspect classification); see also
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 621-31, 670-78 (11th ed. 1985); NOWAK & Ro-
TUNDA, supra note 45, § 14.2, at 570-73; id. §§ 14.5-7, at 605-10; id. § 14.8(d), at 621-31.
155. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 11.4, at 371 (indicating strict scrutiny is
implicated when a fundamental right is impinged); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra
note 47, at 199-201 (discussing the various levels of judicial scrutiny).
156. See, Ingram, supra note 4, at 39 (discussing application of equal protection analy-
sis); Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1131
(1969) [hereinafter Developments in Equal Protection].
157. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 14.3, at 575.
158. See supra notes 35-46.
159. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967).
160. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 24, at 463 (discussing the constitutional right to marry);
Gardner, supra note 25, at 363 n.12 (indicating that the Supreme Court holds heterosexual
marriage as a fundamental right); supra notes 54-86 (discussing the judicial reluctance to
use strict scrutiny when dealing with same-sex marriages).
161. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see also Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
("All persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.").
162. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
163. Id. at 12; see also Trosino, supra note 22, at 106-08; David Margolick, A Mixed
Marriage's 25th Anniversary of Legality, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1992, at B20 (discussing the
historical circumstances leading up to and following the Loving case).
164. See supra notes 54-86.
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In Loving,165 a white man and a black woman, both of whom were
residents of Virginia, were married in the District of Columbia.166 After
returning to Virginia the couple was prosecuted under Virginia's antimis-
cegenation statute.167 They plead guilty and were sentenced by the trial
court; the state's highest court upheld the constitutionality of the stat-
ute.168 The United States Supreme Court held the Virginia statute un-
constitutional and declared that "the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed
by the State. ,169
The Loving Court overcame social as well as legal arguments that in-
terracial marriage was unnatural, detrimental to society, or simply
wrong. 7° Implicit in all same-sex marriage cases, as was the case in inter-
racial marriage cases, 17 1 is the notion that gay couples are different from
heterosexual couples and therefore would damage the institution of mar-
riage.' 72 Loving eviscerated these social stereotypes in the realm of in-
terracial marriages. But courts refuse to extend its holding to recognize
that gay and heterosexual couples are functionally equivalent. 73 The ra-
165. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
166. Id. at 2-3.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 3-4.
169. Id. at 12.
170. Id. at 1-13; see also Trosino, supra note 22, at 97-107 (providing an historical over-
view of antimiscegenation statutes).
171. See, e.g., Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) (sustaining an Alabama statute that
made interracial marriages a crime because such unions would cause discord, shame, and
disruption to families); Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869) (upholding a Georgia statute
prohibiting interracial marriages based on the Court's perception that such marriages were
unnatural and produced "deplorable results"); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883) (indicat-
ing that a Missouri statute prohibiting interracial marriages is not unconstitutional because
such marriages may injure the moral, physical, and emotional well being of the commu-
nity); Trosino, supra note 22, at 102-08 (discussing various cases upholding anti-miscegena-
tion statutes).
172. See Scott, 39 Ga. at 323 (indicating interracial marriages would be harmful to soci-
ety); Trosino, supra note 22, at 108-11. See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Bar-
bara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum
Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967 (1989) (indicating the stereotypes and presumptions underlying
the ban on interracial marriages). One author indicates that interracial marriages were
prohibited because "[t]he social costs of racial mixing and miscegenation were perceived as
so high that few seriously considered permitting the practices." Herbert Hovenkamp, So-
cial Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 657. The same arguments
have been espoused in opposition of permitting same-sex marriages. See supra notes 54-
86.
173. See Fajer, supra note 68, at 546, 550; Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitu-
tion: Toward a Synthesis for "Earthbound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 29, 46 (1992)
(stating that homosexual relationships are characterized by love, companionship, and
closeness just as heterosexual relationships); Trosino, supra note 22, at 108-11; Comment,
Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 197 ("The ingredients of a successful homosexual
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tionales for holding antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional should apply
with equal force to a state's denial of recognition for same-sex mar-
riages. 174 Unfortunately, courts fail to so extend the Loving doctrine.' 75
Courts must recognize that the "constitution[ ] ... may mandate, like it or
not, that customs change with an evolving social order.' ' 1 76 This view of
the Constitution accepts a more activist role for the Court in reviewing
governmental actions. Some scholars perceive a need for greater judicial
restraint and would reject an activist role for the Court. 177
In Perez v. Lippold,7 8 which predated the Loving decision, a court
determined that the true question is not whether interracial marriages are
a fundamental right, but whether marriage is a fundamental right.' 79 The
court perceived the essence of marriage as the right to unite with the
person of one's choosing, and found that any restriction based on race
necessarily impairs that right.'8 ° Just as the Perez and Loving courts
viewed their question as the fundamental right to marry, and not the fun-
damental right to interracial marriage, so too should courts take the same
stand with respect to gay marriages.' 8' The true question is not whether
there is a fundamental right to gay marriage or interracial marriage.
relationship are virtually identical to those of a comparable heterosexual relationship.");
Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Les-
bian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 891 (1985) (indicating
that homosexual and heterosexual relationships share numerous similarities).
174. See Trosino, supra note 22, at 108-16 (indicating that the reasons espoused to pre-
clude same-sex marriages are identical to those put forth to support antimiscegenation
laws).
175. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that two
males were not married for purposes of immigration law), affd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(holding that a same-sex couple could not marry under Pennsylvania's marriage statute).
176. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (1993). One source indicates that the validity of
same-sex marriages discussed in legal texts "testifies to the rapid and drastic social changes
which have occurred." CLARK, supra note 8, § 2.8, at 142.
177. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 1.4, at 13-14; Felix Frankfurter, John Mar-
shall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217 (1955) (indicating that the judicial
philosophy of Justice Marshall was to exercise judicial restraint); J. Skelly Wright, Profes-
sor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971)
(discussing constitutional interpretation and the propensity of Judge J. Skelly Wright to
take an activist view of constitutional interpretation).
178. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 21. The court stated: "Since the essence of the right to marry is [the] free-
dom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice, a segregation statute for marriage
necessarily impairs the right to marry." Id.
181. See Trosino, supra note 22, at 114-16 (discussing the propensity of courts in anti-
miscegenation cases to view the issue as the right to interracial marriage instead of the
right to marry). Contra Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 200 (discussing
the fundamental right to same-sex marriage rather than the fundamental right to marry).
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Rather, the true inquiry revolves around the limits of the fundamental
right to marriage.
182
Courts continually use the traditional definition of marriage as a union
between persons of the opposite sex' 83 for mainly procreative or child
rearing purposes" to legitimize their denial to same-sex couples of the
right to marry.' 85 However, the same definitional argument was used to
uphold antimiscegenation laws.186 Just as courts defined marriage as tra-
ditionally excluding interracial couples, so they define marriage as ex-
cluding same-sex couples.'8 7
B. Homosexuality: A Suspect Classification?
Currently race,' 88 alienage, 89 and national origin' 9° are considered
suspect classifications. The criteria used to identify these suspect classes
are inapplicable to homosexuals. 19 1 These criteria include (1) a long his-
182. See Trosino, supra note 22, at 116; Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's
Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189 (1966) (discussing
the general historical setting of the Loving case and the implications of the Supreme
Court's decision).
183. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972).
184. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56
(Haw. 1993).
185. See supra notes 54-86.
186. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1967); Mark J. Kappelhoff, Bowers v.
Hardwick: Is There a Right to Privacy?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 487, 505 n.143 (1988) (stating
that the Loving Court dismissed the traditional definition of marriage as not including
mixed marriages); Trosino, supra note 22, at 102-08; Edward G. Spitko, Note, A Critique of
Justice Antonin Scalia's Approach to Fundamental Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J.
1337, 1357-59 (indicating that pre-Loving courts relied on the traditional definition of mar-
riage as a union precluding mixed marriages, and Loving's disagreement with that tradi-
tional definition).
187. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEO. L.J. 459, 556-57 (1990) (favoring the Loving Court's shedding of traditional stereo-
types about mixed marriages); Trosino, supra note 22, at 112-13; supra notes 54-86 and
accompanying text.
188. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
189. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633, 640 (1948).
190. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
191. See infra notes 194-220 and accompanying text. In 1986 the Supreme Court held
that there is no fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). The Court did not address whether homosexuals are enti-
tled to protection as a suspect class. The Court's reluctance to extend constitutional
protection to homosexual sodomy does not preclude the recognition of same-sex mar-
riages. Such relationships are not necessarily intertwined with the act of sodomy, but are
based on legal rights, love, sharing, companionship, and numerous other emotive qualities.
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tory of discrimination as a class; (2) possession of a characteristic that
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society; (3) being
marked by a badge of opprobrium; (4) relegation to a position of political
powerlessness; and (5) possession of an immutable characteristic that is
either inherent or uncontrollable. 92 Because of these criteria there ap-
pears to be little hope of finding the light of suspect classification for
homosexuals at the end of the judicial tunnel. 193
Unquestionably, homosexuals have experienced a long history of
discrimination' 94 and are more than capable of contributing to soci-
See Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 625 (1989) (indicating that recognition of same-sex mar-
riages is a separate issue from prohibitions on homosexual sodomy); Developments in the
Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1606-07 n.23 (1989)
(same). A large number of states currently retain criminal sanctions against consensual
sodomy. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
1411, -1412 (1989); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-14-122 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502
(1989); FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD. CODE ANN.
CRIM. LAW § 554 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.158, .338, .338a, .338b (1986); MINN.
STAT. § 609.293 (1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090
(1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1992); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
10-1 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.06 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361
(Michie Supp. 1993).
This Comment does not maintain that homosexuality should not be perceived as a sus-
pect classification; rather, it merely states that suspect classification should not be pursued
as a means to achieve legal recognition of same-sex marriages because of judicial reluc-
tance to extend suspect classification to cover homosexuals. The numerous other argu-
ments for legal recognition of same-sex marriages espoused in this Comment are more
likely to be met with success.
192. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (discussing
the criteria of history of discrimination, political powerlessness, and immutability); Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (discussing the criteria of gross
stereotypes, immutability, and visibility); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976)
(same); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (same); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-87 (1973) (same); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (same); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 508 (D.D.C. 1967)
(same), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47,
at 202-03 (discussing the elements of suspect classification). See generally Ruth B. Gins-
burg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975) (discussing the need to hold
gender as a suspect classification); Edward A. Fallone, Comment, Preserving The Public
Health: A Proposal to Quarantine Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 441, 491-97
(1988) (discussing various criteria used by courts to define a suspect class).
193. See Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 202-06.
194. See RICHARD PLANT, THE PINK TRIANGLE (1986) (discussing the treatment of
homosexuals in Germany under Hitler's rule); Ellen M. Barrett, Legal Homophobia and
the Christian Church, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1019 (1979) (indicating a history of discrimination
against gays from early christian times); Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal
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ety.195 Plato, Michelangelo, Francis Bacon, Julius Caesar, Emily Dickin-
son, and Leonardo da Vinci are a sparse list of gay individuals whose
sexual preference bore no relation to their ability to contribute to world
knowledge and culture.' 96 Similarly, there can be little doubt that being
gay is to be marked with a badge of opprobrium.'9 7 The classes which are
Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 797, 824-25 (1984) (discussing the historical discrimination faced by homosexuals).
One author states that "[in the United States, homosexuals have been persecuted and
even imprisoned." GILBERT D. NASS & GERALD W. McDONALD, MARRIAGE AND THE
FAMILY 497-98 (2d ed. 1982). Homosexuals face discrimination in the United States, as
well as in numerous other countries across the globe:
[H]omosexuality ... in various societies [is] enough to warrant segregation, im-
prisonment, even capital punishment. In Cuba homosexuals are often thrown in
jail and in China, they are sometimes subjected to shock treatment .... Basil
Davidson, in his book The African Genius, observes that African tribes such as
the Nyakyusa ... regard homosexuality as a sin and a sickness "occasioned by
witchcraft."
DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS
80 (1991) (quoting BASIL DAVIDSON, THE AFRICAN GENIUS 73 (1970)).
While England has decriminalized homosexual conduct it still prohibits teaching or pub-
lishing material which promotes homosexuality. Local Government Act 1986 (c 10) § 2A
(prohibiting the promotion of homosexuality by teaching or publication); Baker v. Wade,
553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (indicating England has decriminalized homosex-
ual conduct for years), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986). Homosexuals have also experienced discrimination in the area of employ-
ment. See, e.g., Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Note, Government Employment and the Homosexual, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 303 (1970).
195. Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 203. One author indicates that
"studies ... have found an overall similarity between heterosexual's and homosexual's
psychic adjustment and job performance." Id.; see also Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161,
1165-68 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (indicating that plaintiff's dismissal was not proper because his
homosexuality did not affect his job effectiveness); PLATO, ON HOMOSEXUALITY: LYSIS,
PHAEDRUS, AND SYMPOSIUM (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1991) (discussing the prevalence of
sexual intimacy between adult males and adolescent males in both Greek society and
Plato's dialogues The Symposium, The Lysis, and The Phaedrus); Gay Clout: The New
Power Brokers, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1993, at 45 (listing numerous powerful and prominent
homosexuals, such as Barney Frank, Joan Nestle, Martina Navratilova, and Patricia Ire-
land); supra notes 100-02 (discussing the abilities of same-sex couples to raise children).
196. See THOMAS COWAN, GAY MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENRICHED THE WORLD
(1988) (listing 40 individuals who have contributed to world culture and knowledge); Sylvia
A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187,205 n.89
(quoting Freud as mentioning the homosexuality of da Vinci, Plato, and Michelangelo);
Out of History, Gannett News Service, Apr. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
GNS File (listing numerous gay individuals who have impacted the world in the last 3000
years).
197. See Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 204-05; see also KNOX, supra
note 111, at 78 (stating that homosexual persons are not instantly recognizable).
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perceived as suspect, such as race,1 8 alienage,1 99 and national origin,2"
all have visibly identifiable characteristics. 20 ' Homosexuality appears to
lack this overtly identifiable element.2 °2 Psychologists recognize that gay
persons are not instantly recognizable.20 3 While Justice Stevens has indi-
cated that a personal characteristic "not as apparent to the observer as
sex or race" is not "any less odious,, 20 4 actual court holdings indicate that
readily identifiable characteristics are paramount.20 5
The political power of homosexuals is continually growing in
strength.206 Gays are demanding and acquiring greater rights nationally
and locally.2 7 Some universities and graduate schools now offer prefer-
ential treatment programs for homosexuals.208 While the political power
of gays continues to grow, there are still numerous gays who hide their
198. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
199. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948).
200. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
201. See Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 204.
202. See Fajer, supra note 68, at 511 (discussing the numerous similarities between het-
erosexual and homosexual couples and their lifestyles).
203. See KNOX, supra note 111, at 78.
204. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 523 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (using middle scrutiny for gender discrimi-
nation cases); supra note 192.
206. See BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (1987) (pro-
viding an historical overview of the rise of homosexual political power); PETER FISHER,
THE GAY MYSTIQUE 210-12 (2d ed. 1975) (discussing the increasing political strength of
homosexuals); Mark Curriden, Sodomy Laws Challenged: Gay Activists Find Successes In
Some State Courts, Legislatures, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 38 ("Texas is the latest battle-
ground for gay activists who are fighting to repeal sodomy laws."); Homosexual Politics:
After Aids, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1993, at 26 (indicating that gays are now one of the
most powerful forces in politics) [hereinafter Homosexual Politics].
207. See, e.g., Steve Friedman, Colorado's Amendment 2 Blocked: Court Says Referen-
dum Barring Gay-Rights Laws Denies Equal Protection, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 48-49 ("By
prohibiting legislative protections for gay men and women, Colorado voters effectively de-
nied them equal participation in the political process .... "); Howard Fineman, Marching to
the Mainstream, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1993, at 42 (discussing the increase in gay power be-
cause of increased money and insider clout within the gay world); Homosexual Politics,
supra note 206, at 26 ("Homosexuals [are] more visible, their money more plentiful, their
issues more discussed than ever before."); Debbie Howlett, Unruly or Unseen, A Split on
Fight for Change: Two Camps Struggling Over Tactics, USA TODAY, June 25, 1993, at 12A
(discussing various homosexual power groups fight for gay rights); Joseph P. Shapiro et al.,
Straight Talk About Gays, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 5, 1993, at 42 (discussing the
increased presence of homosexuals in American society). See generally ADAM, supra note
206, at 1 (discussing the historical evolution of the gay movement).
208. See D'SouzA, supra note 194, at 5 ("In 1989, the Columbia Law Review an-
nounced a recruitment program offering preferential treatment for homosexuals and lesbi-
ans. The journal added five extra seats to its editorial board to promote 'diversity,'
including special consideration for 'sexual orientation.' ").
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sexual preference out of fear. 20 9 This fear may diminish their numbers,
but this does not affect their political power base.210 As gays become
more politically powerful, already reluctant courts will have further rea-
sons to deny suspect classification to gays.21'
Lastly, the immutability question is a difficult hurdle to overcome.
While much research indicates a biological origin of homosexuality, nu-
merous individuals challenge such a finding.212 Due to the muddled na-
ture of this area of science and politics, it is unlikely that courts will
venture into this political hot bed.213 A court already reluctant to expand
the definition of marriage to include same-sex marriages will not touch
the question of the origins of homosexuality.
214
209. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 8, § 2.8, at 142 (stating that "many homosexuals natu-
rally choose to conceal, or not to reveal, their identities"); KNOX, supra note 111, at 78
(citing a 1984 poll indicating 55% of the 1000 women aged 18 to 65 surveyed felt that
homosexuality was not an acceptable alternative life-style); David H. Pollack, Comment,
Forced Out of the Closet: Sexual Orientation and The Legal Dilemma of "Outing", 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 711 (1992) (discussing the various implications of leaving the closet for
homosexuals); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 204-05 (indicating there
are individuals who have antagonistic feelings toward homosexuals); Shapiro, supra note
207, at 46 (stating that "[w]ith 1,898 hate crimes against gays and lesbians reported in just
five major cities last year, many homosexuals fear that coming out can result in injury or
even death"); James D. Wilson, Gays Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 35, 37
(indicating that a poll found 58% of those surveyed disagreed with same-sex marriages).
210. See supra notes 206-08.
211. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 14.3, at 573-74; Tussman, supra note 93,
at 366 (discussing the Supreme Court's espoused need for self-restraint).
212. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843,849 (D. Md. 1973) (discuss-
ing the origins of homosexuality), affd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974); DOUGLAS A. BERNSTEIN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY 426-27 (1988) (discussing genetic or
hormonal, familial, and social theories for the origin of homosexuality); CLARK, supra note
8, § 2.8, at 144 (stating that numerous studies "have not produced agreement... concern-
ing the origins of homosexuality"); HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIo-
LOGICAL ISSUES, supra note 103, at 165-209 (containing numerous articles by various
authors discussing alternative origins of homosexuality); ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEX-
UAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 447 (1953) (listing various factors possibly leading
to homosexual behavior); DAVID P. MCWHIRTER ET AL., HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXU-
ALITY: CONCEPTS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION (1990) (containing numerous articles espous-
ing various theories for the origin of homosexuality); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 101-08 (1992) (indicating a possible origin for homosexuality in genetics, and dis-
cussing parental, societal, and hormonal theories for the origin of homosexuality); Wardell
B. Pomeroy, Homosexuality, in THE SAME SEX: AN APPRAISAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 3
(Ralph W. Weltge ed., 1969); Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scien-
tific, Historical, and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REV. 55, 59 (1991) (discussing various
biological, psychological, and social theories for the origin of homosexuality); Chandler
Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1993, at 47 (discussing various
arguments espousing a biological origin for homosexuality); William A. Henry III, Born
Gay?, TIME, July 26, 1993, at 36 (same).
213. See supra notes 35-133 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 54-86. The Supreme Court continually indicates a proclivity to-
ward judicial restraint. A majority of the Court recently stated: "The best that can be said
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Although gays have experienced a long history of discrimination215 and
have the abilities to contribute to society, 216 courts are reluctant to char-
acterize gays as politically impotent217 or as possessing an immutable
characteristic. 218 Any hope of granting same-sex couples the fundamen-
tal right to marry will not lie with designating homosexuality as a suspect
classification. Courts are reluctant to enter into the political whirlwind
that surrounds homosexuality.219 Homosexuality is not poised on the
brink of acceptance as a suspect classification.22°
C. Look at the Part Not the Whole!: Sex Discrimination and Middle-
Level Scrutiny
The Supreme Court articulates a middle-tier standard of scrutiny for
discrimination based on gender.221 This middle level of scrutiny requires
is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between
that liberty and the demands of organized society." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) (balancing the goals of stare decisis and individual liberty). Justice
O'Connor's discussion of the need to balance individual liberty and the "demands of or-
ganized society" was used by one commentator to argue against lifting prohibitions against
same-sex marriages. Stoddard & Fein, supra note 22, at 43 (stating that "[ejach legal issue
regarding homosexuality should be examined discretely with the recognition that time has
upset many fighting faiths and with the goal of balancing individual liberty against commu-
nity interests. With regard to homosexual marriage, that balance is negative."); see also
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (displaying judicial restraint and reluctance to
extend constitutional protection in the area of homosexual sodomy); Tussman & tenBroek,
supra note 93, at 366 (discussing the propensity of the Supreme Court to exercise judicial
restraint whenever possible); Paul L. Alpern, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Uneasy
Interaction Between Legislative Intent and Judicial Restraint, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
213, 221 (1987) (discussing and supporting the Supreme Court's espoused need for judicial
restraint in the area of homosexual conduct).
215. See supra note 194 (citing several sources discussing discriminatory treatment of
homosexuals in numerous countries around the world). See generally DAVID F. GREEN-
BERG, THE CONSTRUCTiON OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988) (discussing the historical evolution
of homosexuality in society and tracing its development).
216. See supra notes 195-96.
217. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text. See generally D'SOUZA, supra
note 194, at 3 ("The coveted perks of... affirmative action policies have sometimes been
extended to other groups claiming deprivation and discrimination, such as ... homosexu-
als[,] and lesbians.").
218. See supra notes 212-14.
219. See supra notes 54-86 and accompanying text; see also Melton, supra note 88, at
497 (discussing the changing nature of the American family and the need for the courts to
deal with this reality).
220. See Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 200-06 (arguing that homo-
sexuality is not a suspect classification).
221. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (applying an intermediate level of
review to gender discrimination cases); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at
207 (discussing the Supreme Court's use of an intermediate level of review in gender dis-
crimination cases).
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state statutes concerning gender to have an important governmental in-
terest that utilizes means substantially related to permissible ends.222
This middle-level scrutiny is applied to classifications based on sex.223
Since Singer v. Hara,224 no court has held a statute limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples as a classification based on sex. 225 The Hawaii
Supreme Court, however, recently took this first crucial step in Baehr v.
Lewin.226 In Singer, the State of Washington found no gender-discrimi-
nation when "all same-sex marriages are deemed illegal by the state...
[since] there is no [gender discrimination] so long as marriage licenses are
denied equally to both male and female pairs., 227 This argument is spe-
cious and was explicitly repudiated by the Loving Court.228 In Loving
the state argued that both blacks and whites were equally denied the right
to interracial marriage. 229 However, the Court stated that the true in-
quiry is whether the statute constitutes an arbitrary and invidious discrim-
ination.23 ° Any denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry should
trigger the question of whether the discrimination is arbitrary or
invidious.
In Baehr v. Lewin, however the Hawaii Supreme Court held that its
state marriage statute denied a same-sex couple access to the status of
222. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 14.23, at 743-51 (discussing gender clas-
sifications and intermediate review); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 207
(same).
223. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Marc S. Gerber, Note, Equal Protection, Public Choice Theory, and Learnfare:
Wealth Classifications Revisited, 81 GEO. L.J. 2141, 2147 (1993) (stating that an intermedi-
ate level scrutiny has been applied to classifications based on sex); Note, Sex Discrimina-
tion and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv.
1499 (1971).
224. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974); see supra
notes 62-74 (discussing the Singer case and other pertinent prior case law).
225. See supra notes 54-86 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
227. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191.
228. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see Trosino, supra note 22, at 107-08, 113
(discussing the reasoning of the Loving Court and its application to same-sex marriages);
see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 11; Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court
at the Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY L.J. 949,
962 (1988) ("The same rationale was used to defend miscegenation laws: no one was being
discriminated against, since neither whites nor blacks could marry a person outside their
race."); Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of
Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1992) ("The Supreme Court found
antimiscegenation laws to be race discrimination because they 'proscribe generally ac-
cepted conduct [only] if engaged in by members of different races.' " (quoting Loving, 388
U.S. at 11)).
229. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-12; Trosino, supra note 22, at 106-08.
230. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
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marriage on the basis of the applicant's sex.23 ' The Baehr court implicitly
repudiated the state's argument in Singer that equal protection analysis is
not triggered in same-sex marriage cases because no sex discrimination
has occurred.232 The Baehr decision makes clear that the Singer court
misconstrued the true question. The question is not whether both males
and females are prohibited from same-sex marriages. Instead, the true
inquiry concerns the prohibition of entry into the marital bond based on a
person's gender.23  To illustrate, take the example of a same-sex couple
composed of two females. If one of the partners in that relationship were
a male, she would be permitted to marry the other partner. However,
because of her sex she is precluded from doing so; therefore, the union of
marriage is withheld from her due to her gender.234 The Singer court
isolated the "relationship" and determined that males and females were
both precluded from marrying partners of the same sex.235 However, the
231. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993); see also Henry J. Reske, Gay Mar-
riage Ban Unconstitutional?: Hawaii Supreme Court Thinks So, Unless State Can Show
Compelling Interest, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 28 ("The decision is significant because it is the
first to hold that bias against homosexuals is sex discrimination.").
232. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60; Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), review
denied, 87 Wash. 2d. 1008 (1974). Although the Baehr court never explicitly makes this
assertion, the espoused result may be inferred due to the court's explicit recognition that
the state's marriage statute, under which the court determined there was no protection for
or recognition of same-sex marriages, regulated access to marriage, on the basis of sex.
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
233. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64-68. The underlying principle of equal protection analysis is
that persons similarly situated should be treated the same. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (striking down a statute that failed to provide a female worker the
same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received); United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 517 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating
that "individuals similarly situated must receive the same treatment" (emphasis added));
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Lewis, supra note 106, at
1785 (discussing equal protection analysis).
234. See generally Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality,
Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983) (cataloging and analyzing
Supreme Court cases dealing with sex discrimination). The true question in gender dis-
crimination cases is whether individuals are being classified on the basis of their gender
and not simply whether men and women are treated alike. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60
(stating that it is the state's regulation of access to the status of married persons, on the
basis of the applicant's gender, that triggers an equal protection analysis). While this dis-
tinction might appear nonexistent, when applied in the area of same-sex marriages it can
make all the difference. See id.; see also Singer, 522 P.2d at 1187 (utilizing the above dis-
tinction to prohibit same-sex marriages). This distinction is represented implicitly by the
dichotomous views of the Singer and Baehr courts on the question of same-sex marriages.
This same distinction is used to argue that sodomy laws are discriminatory against gay
persons because "[t]he physical acts themselves.., are the same whether between a man
and a woman or two persons of the same-sex." Developments in the Law-Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1527 n.57 (1989).
235. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191.
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court should have isolated the individual partners in that relationship and
determined if one of those partners were a member of the opposite sex
would that partner have been permitted to marry the other individual.236
The analysis used in Singer was rebuffed explicitly in Loving.2 37 In the
case of same-sex marriages, the words male and female merely need to be
substituted for white and black,238 thereby looking at the part and not the
whole. Any denial of recognition of same-sex marriages should implicate
an intermediate level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
239
After determining the proper level of scrutiny to be applied, the second
aspect of equal protection analysis must be examined: identification of an
important governmental interest in the prohibition of same-sex marriages
that is substantially related to those interests.24 °
1. Why?: State Interests Behind Prohibition of Same-Sex Marriages
There are four primary reasons espoused by states for preclusion of
same-sex marriages: to foster procreation, foster morality, encourage
family stability, and support bans on homosexual acts.241 None of these
reasons are sufficient to meet the middle-level of scrutiny applied to sex
discrimination cases.242
236. See generally Murry, 413 U.S. at 517 (stating that individuals similarly situated
must receive the same treatment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (rejecting an
argument similar to the Singer court's rationale in the context of interracial marriages);
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44-68 (discussing the court's rationale for its holding).
237. The Court stated: "We have rejected the proposition ... that the requirement of
equal protection of the laws is satisfied ... so long as white and Negro participants in the
offense [are] similarly [treated]." Loving, 388 U.S. at 10; Trosino, supra note 22, at 113
(drawing a link between the rationale rejected by the Loving court and similar arguments
espoused in same-sex marriage cases). In Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882), overruled
by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), this rejected equal application doctrine was
first applied. See Trosino, supra note 22, at 106-07.
238. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44-68. One may infer the same rationale found in Loving
from the Baehr court's reasoning.
239. See supra notes 221-36 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, §§ 14.20-.24, at 733-51 (discussing
Supreme Court treatment of gender classifications).
241. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 8, § 2.8, at 145-47 (listing various reasons for prohibit-
ing same-sex marriages); Ingram, supra note 4, at 46 (espousing several state reasons for
precluding same-sex marriages); Weitzman, supra note 29, at 1243 (discussing numerous
state interests in regulating marriage); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at
210-11 (same); Note, Legality, supra note 51, at 580-82 (same).
242. The following discussion applies to both middle-tier scrutiny and strict scrutiny. If
the state's reasons for prohibiting same-sex marriages is inadequate under the lower mid-
dle-tier scrutiny, they will not pass the higher strict scrutiny standard. See supra notes 87-
151, 161-87 and accompanying text (indicating hetereosexual couples have the protection
of the fundamental right to marry).
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a. Fostering Procreation
While procreation is vital to the human race, increasing numbers of
individuals are raising children out of wedlock and numerous married
couples are not having children. 43 Under the umbrella of the right of
privacy, individuals have the fundamental right to procreate,2 44 to use
contraceptives (or not to procreate),2 45 to raise one's children,2 46 and to
have an abortion. 47 Such rights indicate that one has the freedom to
procreate and raise one's resulting children; however, these rights also
indicate that one may choose not to procreate. The established rights to
use contraceptives, not to procreate, or to have an abortion indicate that
while procreation is an important state interest, individuals have a great
deal of control over their bodies.2 48 Permitting such rights while prohibit-
ing same-sex marriages in the name of procreation penalizes a choice (not
to procreate) protected by the Constitution.
If marriage is meant to encourage procreation, and same-sex couples
are precluded from this union because of their supposed inability to pro-
create,249 then heterosexual couples who are sterile, infertile, or impotent
should not be permitted to marry.250  Prohibiting same-sex marriages
243. See, e.g., INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 812 (43d ed. 1990) (indicating that
births to unmarried women have increased more than six-fold between 1950 and 1986)
[hereinafter ALMANAC]; ALBERT D. KLASSEN ET AL., SEX AND MORALITY IN THE U.S.
113-14 (1989) (discussing an increased acceptance of premarital sex among the general
public); The Bargain Breaks, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 26, 1992, at 37 (indicating that one in
four births is to a single mother) [hereinafter Bargain Breaks]; John Leo, A Pox on Dan
and Murphy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 1, 1992, at 19 (quoting a recent report
indicating an increasing rate of out-of-wedlock childbearing); Barbara D. Whitehead, Dan
Quayle Was Right, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993, at 50 (indicating that the out-of-wedlock
birth rate "went from five percent in 1960 to twenty-seven percent in 1990 ... [and] one
out of every four women who had a child in 1990 was not married").
244. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding the right to privacy encom-
passes the right to choose to procreate).
245. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy
includes the choice to use contraceptives).
246. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (indicating that the right to privacy
includes the right to choose how to raise one's children).
247. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (indicating that the right to privacy includes the
ability to choose to have an abortion).
248. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
250. However, this has not been the view of the courts that have examined the issue.
See T. v. M., 242 A.2d 670 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968) (indicating that one may not
receive an annulment due to sterility); Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div.
1948) (indicating that the inability to have children does not preclude one from the institu-
tion of marriage); see also Ingram, supra note 4, at 47 (indicating an inconsistency in per-
mitting heterosexual couples incapable of procreation to marry while precluding same-sex
couples from marrying because of their inability to procreate); Rivera, supra note 110, at
879-80 (indicating that homosexuality on the part of one's spouse is not grounds for di-
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while permitting the forgoing heterosexual couples to marry is contrary
to the state's espoused interest in fostering procreation.251 Furthermore,
the drastic increase in out-of-wedlock births indicates that the human
race continues to propagate outside the institution of marriage.252 There-
fore, discrimination against same-sex marriages as a measure to promote
procreation, is arbitrary and irrational. Such discrimination is not sub-
stantially related to achieving the state's goal of fostering procreation.
b. Fostering Morality
The state's interest in promoting morality through marriage is directed
primarily toward sexual intercourse.253 Many state laws attempt to regu-
late various types of sexual acts either inside or outside of the marital
bond: acts such as fornication, adultery, bigamy, and statutory rape.254
While these laws are geared toward legitimate state interests, the inter-
ests are not substantially furthered by prohibiting same-sex marriages.
255
The rate of out of wedlock births continues to increase; thereby, indicat-
ing that prohibiting same-sex marriages does not further the state's inter-
est in morality.256 Nor is there any evidence that discriminating against
same-sex marriages decreases the incidence of homosexual activity. Pro-
vorce); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 93, at 344 (indicating that those in a similar posi-
tion should be similarly treated).
251. See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 243.
253. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 47-48 (discussing the state's interest in fostering mo-
rality by prohibiting same-sex marriages).
254. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1982) (addressing the act of fornication and
making the act of adultery a misdemeanor); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050 (1991) (indicating
that adultery is grounds for a divorce); CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 1988) (making the
act of incest a crime); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (1986) (making the act of adultery a
crime); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-190 (Supp. 1993) (making the act of bigamy a crime); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-1002 (1989) (defining the act of fornication and making it a crime); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (Michie 1992) (indicating that the act of fornication is a misde-
meanor); IDAHO CODE § 18-1103 (1987) (indicating that bigamy is a crime in the state of
Idaho); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 18 (1990) ("Whoever commits fornication shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not more than three months or by a fine of not more than thirty
dollars."); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1988) ("Any person, not being married, who
voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse with any other person, shall be guilty of fornica-
tion, punishable as a Class 4 misdemeanor."); Beasley v. State, 96 So. 2d 693 (Ala. Ct. App.
1957) (indicating conviction for the crime of adultery is grounds for disqualification as a
juror); Jackson v. Williams, 123 S.W. 751 (Ark. 1909) (holding the act of fornication as
criminal behavior).
255. See supra note 243.
256. See, e.g., KLASSEN, supra note 243, at 113-14 (indicating an increase in the accept-
ance of premarital sex); Bargain Breaks, supra note 243, at 37 (stating that the United
States has one of the highest incidence of out-of-wedlock births in the industrial world).
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hibition of same-sex marriages thus is not substantially related to protect-
ing the moral fabric of our society.
c. Encouraging Family Stability
Although the state has an important interest in maintaining family sta-
bility,257 forbidding same-sex marriages is not substantially related to fur-
thering this goal.258 As time passes, incidence of divorce increases,
259
youth violence increases,260 and domestic violence increases.261 From all
indications, family stability is decreasing by leaps and bounds while same-
sex couples continue to be precluded from marrying.262 Additionally,
there is every indication that same-sex couples share the same values and
concerns as the heterosexual community.263 Some courts have even al-
257. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (holding that a New York separa-
tion decree granting alimony to one spouse survived a subsequent Nevada divorce decree).
258. See BozETr, supra note 101, at 89-175 (containing numerous articles by various
authors discussing gay parents and related issues); KNOX, supra note 111, at 78 (discussing
the continuum on which homosexuality and heterosexuality exist and that no person is
entirely homosexual or heterosexual in attitudes or behavior); Rivera, supra note 110, at
799 (indicating only six percent of the population has a family structure of a husband sup-
porting a wife and a child); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 212-13.
259. See ALMANAC, supra note 243, at 807 (indicating that in 1988 out of over two
million marriages over one million ended in divorce); BRYAN STRONG & CHRISTINE DE
VAULT, THE MARRIAGE AND FAMILY EXPERIENCE 490 (1986) ("If the current trend con-
tinues, 49 percent of all persons between the ages twenty-nine and thirty-five years will
divorce by age seventy-five."); Leo, supra note 243, at 19 ("American children are far more
likely to grow up with only one parent than they were just a generation ago."); Whitehead,
supra note 243, at 50 ("In 1974 divorce passed death as the leading cause of family
breakup.").
260. See Whitehead, supra note 243, at 77.
261. See generally Carolyne R. Hathaway, Comment, Gender Based Discrimination in
Police Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEO. L.J. 667 (1986)
(discussing various cases of domestic assault). "It has been estimated that between 30 to 50
percent of all marriages will at some point involve the use of physical violence and that
annually as many as two million children may be physically abused by their parents."
Elissa P. Benedek, Baseball, Apple Pie, and Violence: Is It American?, in FAMILY VIO-
LENCE: EMERGING ISSUES OF A NATIONAL CRISIS 1, 6 (Leah J. Dickstein & Carol Nadel-
son eds. 1989). When domestic violence cases are brought to court, the violence continues
in the courtroom. "[I]n a survey of 385 women in Colorado who were granted protective
orders, 17 percent were either verbally or physically assaulted in the courthouse by their
former partners." Henry J. Reske, Domestic Retaliations: Escalating Violence In The Fam-
ily Courts, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 49. Family court proceedings are increasingly becoming
places where "assaults, shootings and deaths resulting from the emotionally charged at-
mosphere of marital breakups and child custody disputes," occur. Id. at 48.
262. See supra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
263. Fajer, supra note 68, at 511. Homosexual relationships are filled with love and
compassion similar to that of ideal heterosexual relationships. Id.; see also Jerry J. Bigner
& R. Brooke Jacobsen, Parenting Behaviors of Homosexual and Heterosexual Fathers, in
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 173 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989); Jerry J. Bigner &
R. Brooke Jacobsen, The Value of Children to Gay and Heterosexual Fathers, in HOMOSEX-
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lowed same-sex couples to adopt and raise children.264 The continued
decrease in family stability despite the prohibition against same-sex mar-
riages,265 and indications that numerous gay relationships share values
identical to those of ideal heterosexual couples,2 66 suggest that there is no
correlation between prohibiting same-sex marriages and family
instability.267
d. Supporting Prohibitions on Gay Acts
While numerous states have laws prohibiting homosexual acts,268 there
is no indication that prohibiting same-sex marriages decreases the occur-
rence of homosexual acts.2 69 As a matter of fact, the prohibition of same-
sex marriages may foster greater promiscuity.27 ° Additionally, some
countries that have repealed their laws prohibiting homosexual conduct
have not noticed an appreciable increase in homosexual conduct.27 '
There is little connection between a state's policy of prohibiting gay acts
and banning gay marriages. Additionally, a prohibition on same-sex mar-
riages to curtail gay acts is overinclusive because it sweeps within its pa-
UALITY AND THE FAMILY, supra, at 163; Letitia A. Peplau & Susan D. Cochran, Value
Orientations in the Intimate Relationships of Gay Men, in GAY RELATIONSHIPS 195 (John
P. De Cecco ed., 1986).
264. See supra notes 101-02.
265. See supra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
266. See KNOX, supra note 111, at 78 (indicating homosexuals and heterosexuals ex-
press and experience love in the same manner); NASS, supra note 194, at 498-99 (indicating
homosexuals and heterosexuals share numerous similarities); Fajer, supra note 68, at 512
(same).
267. See supra notes 253-64 and accompanying text. Several commentators have even
argued "that the values which underlie heterosexual relationships are furthered by stable
homosexual relationships." Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey On The Constitutional Right
to Privacy In The Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 636 (1986).
268. See Rivera, supra note 110, at 949-51.
269. See GAY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 263 (containing numerous articles discussing
gay relationships, men who advertise for sex, and the use of personal ads in the gay world);
Gilbert M. Cantor, The Need for Homosexual Law Reform, in THE SAME SEX, supra note
212, at 83, 90 (stating that 95% of homosexuals "have violated, at some time in their lives,
one or more statutes relating to sexual behavior."); Comment, Homosexuals' Right, supra
note 47, at 211 ("There is ... no reason to believe that withholding marital status [to same-
sex couples] will lessen the incidence of homosexuality.").
270. See generally CAROL A.B. WARREN, IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY IN THE GAY
WORLD (1974) (discussing sexual practices and behaviors in the gay world). See KNOX,
supra note 111, at 79 (quoting a survey showing only seven percent of respondents replied
"never" to a question asking how often they go home with a person they have just met,
while 50% said they did so frequently).
271. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (stating several euro-
pean countries that have repealed their laws prohibiting homosexual acts saw little increase
in such activity), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986).
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rameters same-sex couples who might not wish to have sex or are
incapable of doing so.
2 72
Moreover, many scholars argue that the underlying assumptions of
laws banning gay acts are out-dated and wrong.273 Ancient Greek soci-
ety, the foundation of world culture and knowledge, perceived homosex-
uality as an acceptable practice. 7 4 The Siwans of Africa expect all men
to engage in some form of homosexual activity; "those who do not were
considered peculiar., 275 Additionally, numerous present day European
countries either permit consensual private homosexual acts or have lib-
eral laws directed at such acts.2 76 Denmark has gone so far as to legalize
same-sex marriages.
277
272. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 49 (indicating some same-sex couples who wish to
marry may not want a sexual relationship).
273. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 847-48 (D. Md. 1973) (admitting
testimony of an expert witness who determined that sexuality is decided by the age of five
or six), affd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); CLARK, supra note
8, § 2.8, at 143 ("The population seems to be distributed along a continuum at one end of
which is the exclusively heterosexual person and at the other end the exclusively homosex-
ual person, with many falling somewhere in between."); KNOX, supra note 111, at 78
("Rarely is anyone entirely homosexual or heterosexual in both attitudes and behavior.
Rather, our sexual orientation can be placed on a continuum .. "); Anne B. Goldstein,
History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for The Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086-87 (1988) (stating that the Bowers majority
failed to adequately perceive the acceptance of homosexuality throughout history); Com-
ment, Homosexuals' Right, supra note 47, at 211 (discussing homosexuality as a natural
means of sexual expression).
274. See, e.g., NAss, supra note 194, at 498 (picturing the Greek female poet Sappho
with a female lover and indicating in Greek society homosexuality was regarded as life-
enriching); PLATO, THE SYMPOSIUM AND THE PHAEDRUS: PLATO'S EROTIC DIALOGUES
(William S. Cobb trans., 1993).
275. NASS, supra note 194, at 497.
276. Countries such as France, Italy, Belgium, and Spain permit private homosexual
acts; countries such as Germany, Holland, Denmark, and Scandinavia have extremely lib-
eral laws regarding such acts. MICHAEL RUSE, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL IN-
QUIRY 237-38 (1988) (stating several European countries have relaxed or eliminated their
prohibitions on homosexual activity); see also Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130
(N.D. Tex. 1982) (indicating countries such as England, France, Holland, and Finland have
decriminalized homosexual conduct for years), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); see also John Boswell, Sexual and Ethical Catego-
ries in Premodern Europe, in HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALITY, supra note 212, at 15
(discussing historically the treatment of sexual issues in premodern Europe); Matthew
Fawcett, Taking the Middle Path: Recent Swedish Legislation Grants Minimal Property
Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 24 FAM. L.Q. 179, 185 (1990) (stating that the law grant-
ing unmarried cohabitants property rights was extended to include homosexual couples);
Laurence R. Heifer, Note, Finding a Consensus on Equality: The Homosexual Age of Con-
sent and The European Convention on Human Rights, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1044, 1079 (1988)
(indicating that in 1969, Germany "legalized homosexual relations between consenting
adult males by amending Article 175 of its criminal code").
277. See Friedman, supra note 88, at 220 n.237 (stating that Denmark now permits
same-sex marriages); Polikoff, supra note 187, at 555 n.528 (indicating that Denmark per-
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2. Four Strikes and You're Out: Lack of an Important State Interest
The above discussion indicates that no important state interest is suffi-
ciently advanced by a prohibition of same-sex marriages.2 7 s Accordingly,
any state regulation denying same-sex couples the right to marry should
be held invalid as either infringing on the fundamental right to marry
27 9
or as being an impermissible classification based on sex.28 ° Neither the
state's interest in promoting morality, fostering procreation, stabilizing
the family, nor curtailing gay acts is sufficiently important to justify a total
ban on same-sex marriages. 28 1 When balanced against the rights of same-
sex couples to enjoy the numerous benefits and privileges of marriage
and the myriad counter-arguments, the espoused interests of the state fail
to pass muster.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts traditionally define procreation as a logical predicate of mar-
riage. Through this definition courts have legitimized the denial to same-
sex couples of the fundamental right to marriage. However, same-sex
couples satisfy both courts' definition of marriage and alternative defini-
tions of marriage. Moreover, with the continual expansion of the defini-
tion of family, a logical predicate of marriage, courts have created an
illogical situation where same-sex couples are considered families in cer-
tain situations but are never permitted to benefit from the union of
marriage.
Marriage is a fundamental right that is denied to same-sex couples on
account of their common gender. While other groups within our society
are protected from such discrimination, same-sex couples continue to suf-
fer the indignity of such discrimination. Courts must recognize that the
Constitution is a mutable document which has and should mature with
changing times.28 2 Fear of change and progression is unfounded because
they are quite similar to continuity. Change and continuity are merely
discrete points on the continuum of time; society's evolution is simply a
progression along this continuum. The moment has arrived for courts to
mits homosexual activities); Sheilla Rule, Rights for Gay Couples in Denmark, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1989, at A8.
278. See supra notes 243-77 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 35-46.
280. See supra notes 243-77.
281. See supra notes 243-77 and accompanying text.
282. See Butcher v. Superior Ct., 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 64 (1983) ("When it is deter-
mined that the common law or judge-made law is unjust or out of step with the times, we
should have no reluctance to change it. The law is not, nor should it be, static. It must
keep pace with changes in our society .... (citation omitted)).
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